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Foreword 
In spring 2013, after five years of economic unrest, the European Union exited recession. The recovery 
was modest, but it is enduring. By the end of the year, even the countries with the most fragile econ-
omies were expected to see some strengthening of economic activity. Unemployment stabilised, but 
remains unacceptably high in several Member States with stark differences across the Union while 
the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion continues to climb, rising to 125 million by 
the latest estimates.
Eurofound puts flesh on these statistics to provide the knowledge that policymakers need to develop 
policies to tackle the social and work-related challenges facing Europe today. 
For instance, Eurofound’s labour market analyses in 2013 showed that middle-paying jobs, which declined 
heavily in the crisis, continue to be lost; while growth is occurring in higher-paying jobs, it does not 
outweigh that job loss. The jobs being lost are those that employ men mostly; meanwhile, employment 
of women has been growing modestly and they are taking a greater share of those high-paying jobs. 
Still, seven and a-half million young people are out of work and not in any form of education, which 
represents an estimated loss of about €163 billion annually in welfare transfers and lost incomes and 
taxes. The failure to secure a job is delaying their transition into adulthood, preventing them from 
achieving economic independence (and often delaying their establishment of families), with potentially 
detrimental consequences for their long-term financial security and well-being. In this context, decline 
of trust in public institutions (parliaments and governments) across Europe comes as little surprise, but 
what is perhaps unexpected is that the main influence on people’s trust, uncovered by Eurofound’s 
research, is not the perceived economic situation of their country but the quality of public services. In 
this difficult context, Eurofound also focused its analysis on such issues as changing working condi-
tions, the evolution of pay and undeclared work. 
These are just snippets from the trove of knowledge produced by Eurofound in the course of a year, 
built by analysing data and information from diverse and often unique sources. The strength of this 
research is its comparative nature which, in recent times, has pointed up one challenge in particular: 
divergence, across Member States and within them. 
It is our hope that with our research and information exchange, Eurofound can continue to contribute 
to the work of policymakers as they address this and other such challenges moving closer to a more 
competitive and fair Europe.
 Jerzy Ciechański Juan Menéndez-Valdés  
 Chair Director 
 Governing Board Eurofound 
  Erika Mezger
  Deputy Director
  Eurofound 
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1Employment in 
Europe 2013 
The European Union’s growth strategy, Europe 2020, set an employment rate target of 75% by 2020 
among the working age population. In 2013, with EU employment levels averaging 68.8%, the prospect 
of achieving that target looked dim. The European Commission, in its communication on progress in 
reaching the Europe 2020 targets, concedes that – based on recent trends – employment is going to fall 
short of the target, at a rate closer to 72% by 2020 (2014). Economic growth must pick up significantly 
before an upturn in the labour market can be expected, and debate simmers over whether budgetary 
austerity will drive or stifle growth. Economic management aside, attaining higher employment requires 
policies that will make the expanding sectors of the economy accessible and attractive to job-seekers. 
And it will involve the EU and its Member States pursuing ambitious labour market strategies to integrate 
groups that are at present underrepresented in the labour force: women, young people and older people. 
2Divergent labour markets 
The outlook for employment in Europe remains uncertain. 
Towards the end of 2013, labour market conditions showed 
signs of stabilising. Nonetheless, unemployment remained 
high, running at 10.7% in the EU28 and 12.0% in the euro 
zone – scarcely changed since December 2012. With 
the European economy predicted to grow by 1.6%, the 
recovery remains fragile and so hopes of a revival in the 
labour market are subdued; the European Commission has 
predicted just a small decline in unemployment by 2015. 
Split between countries 
As the crisis recedes, the divide between the economically 
precarious and the economically secure Member States 
is manifest in the unemployment statistics, with severe 
levels of joblessness in some countries, particularly 
Greece (28%) and Spain (26%), while others are relatively 
untouched, especially Austria (5%), Germany (5%) and 
Luxembourg (6%). The differential consequences of the 
crisis stem from fundamental structural differences in the 
economies and labour markets of the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ 
countries – economic growth pre-crisis tended to mask 
these differences. 
Prior to the recession, employment grew in all Member 
States except Hungary, but once the crisis struck, countries 
diverged in labour market performance. For some, the 
extent of job loss following the crisis is related to the 
extent of job growth prior to it. For instance, employment 
expanded significantly in Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia and 
Spain up to 2008, but contracted dramatically when their 
economies crashed. Much of this employment loss was 
due to the collapse in the construction sector, which had 
gone through a parallel boom and bust in these countries. 
In contrast, a number of developed western European 
economies showed more limited employment expansion 
pre-crisis, a slowing of employment growth or modest 
declines during the crisis, followed by a resumption of 
growth since 2011: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden all fall into this category. 
In these countries, sharp output declines during the initial 
crisis period were not accompanied by sharp employment 
declines. Labour hoarding – retaining more employees 
than are needed for the level of output – helped to keep 
job losses in check as demand weakened.
3Trends 2003–2013
The annual report of Eurofound’s European Restructuring 
Monitor (ERM) for 2013 charts the transformation of Europe’s 
economy after the financial crisis. The ERM is a database 
of announcements of large-scale job creation and job 
destruction arising from restructuring, as reported in the 
media across Europe. Looking at the trend over the past 
decade, announced job creation surpassed announced 
job destruction for a period between 2006 and 2008, but 
the global financial crisis of 2008 triggered a dramatic 
reversal (Figure 1). Announced job loss rose sharply up to 
the first quarter of 2009, while announced job creation fell 
steeply. While the gap has narrowed since 2010, job loss has 
continued to outstrip job creation in every quarter to date.
Figure 1: Announced job loss and job gain, 2003–2013
Source: ERM
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4Significant sectoral shifts 
The three sectors responsible for the greatest numbers 
of job losses announced in the media following the crisis 
are manufacturing, public administration and defence, and 
financial services (Figure 2). 
Manufacturing 
Even before the crisis, in 2003–2008, manufacturing was 
the biggest contributor to job loss and job gains in the 
ERM, accounting for 40% of each. This is partly because 
manufacturing firms tend to be big and are therefore 
more likely to meet the main threshold for inclusion in the 
ERM database – that is, involving at least 100 job gains or 
losses – and partly because manufacturing accounts for 
a declining share of the European labour force.
Announced job losses in manufacturing after 2008 rose 
modestly compared to the pre-crisis period. What really 
affected the sector badly was the drop in the level of job 
creation announced in this period, which was roughly half 
that for 2003–2008. Across the two periods, the total net 
job loss (gross job loss minus gross job gain) announced 
by European manufacturing companies increased from 
over 200,000 pre-crisis to over 600,000 post-crisis. 
Representative data from the EU Labour Force Survey (EU 
LFS) show that over 4.5 million jobs were lost between 2008 
and 2013, representing 12% of manufacturing employment.
Figure 2: Main sectors of announced job loss and job gain, 2003–2013
Note: This figure reflects the sum of announced job gains across all business expansion cases and announced job 
losses across all job loss cases recorded in the ERM for each sector in the periods indicated. 
Source: ERM
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5Public administration 
Comparing pre- and post-crisis periods, the biggest 
increases in announced job loss have been in public 
administration and defence. When job losses in the public 
administration sector (which includes defence) are reported, 
they usually involve sizeable numbers. The biggest single 
case in the ERM dataset is the axing of 54,000 jobs in 
military and civilian defence announced in June 2008 by 
the French government. Data from the EU LFS indicate 
that employment in public administration contracted by 3% 
between 2008 and 2013, reflecting cuts in public spending 
as national governments across Europe implemented 
financial consolidation programmes in response to the crisis.
Overhauling central public administration 
Reductions in the size of public administrations across 
Europe have been accompanied by the intensification 
of ongoing structural reforms aimed at modernising 
operations and services. In 2013, Eurofound studied 
the impact of these reforms on the part of public 
administration known as ‘central public administration’ 
or CPA, which broadly comprises those administrative 
units that operate at central and national levels and have 
a hierarchical dependence on political decision-making 
(usually, the ministries of government).
The reforms undertaken include the introduction of new 
organisational structures, new management cultures 
with more emphasis on performance, and new human 
resource management techniques alongside a shift 
towards offering more services online and an expansion 
of outsourcing strategies. 
Well-qualified entrants are often over-qualified for the jobs 
they take. In some cases, this reflects the recruitment 
behaviour of the employer in asking for a higher degree of 
educational attainment than is needed for the job. In the 
context of the economic crisis, with limited job vacancies, 
however, many young, highly educated unemployed are 
willing to take any job they can get. 
These structural reforms have had some negative 
effects on CPA workers and their working conditions, 
including reduced job security, cuts or freezes in earnings, 
increased working times and workloads, and reduced 
opportunities for skill development. 
The general deterioration in working conditions in 
CPA has affected social dialogue and has led, in many 
Member States, to industrial action and greater difficulty 
in reaching compromises and agreements between 
the government and trade unions. Nevertheless, many 
Member States have plans for more reforms that are 
likely to have further impacts on both the employment 
levels of public workers and their working conditions.
Financial services
In the financial services sector, the ERM records 33 cases 
entailing at least 2,000 job losses each since 2008, and 
the EU LFS shows that employment has contracted by 
2.4% in financial services and insurance since 2008. Many 
of the job cuts in banking resulted from agreements with 
governments to reduce assets, costs and employment as 
a condition for receiving state aid, hence enabling many 
banks to survive the financial crisis. The ERM includes 
18 cases of job loss in the UK banking group Lloyds TSB 
since April 2009. The bank has shed some 35,000 jobs 
in the post-crisis period. 
Construction
Construction had the greatest relative loss in employment 
during and after the crisis. According to EU LFS data, 
one in five construction jobs has disappeared since 2008 
and employment has more than halved in some of the 
Member States worst affected by the crisis. This sector 
is underrepresented in the ERM, however, because firms 
are small on average and therefore the restructurings often 
do not meet the threshold for inclusion. 
6Retail
On the positive side, retail has created one-fifth of all new 
jobs reported in the ERM since 2008. That good news is 
counterbalanced, however, by an increase in the proportion 
of announced job loss associated with the sector between 
pre-crisis and post-crisis, from 4% to 8%. Overall, EU LFS 
data show that employment in retail has shrunk by nearly 
3% since 2008. This high turnover of jobs in the sector 
reflects the demise of traditional businesses (such as 
Woolworths in the UK and Schlecker in Germany) alongside 
the expansion of retail groups in the low-cost or discount 
segments, such as Edeka, Lidl, Tesco and IKEA.
Online retailing is a growing source of employment: the 
ERM records over 18,000 jobs created by Amazon since 
2011. However, many jobs in online retail are classified 
under transportation and storage because the work is 
based in warehouses or ‘fulfilment centres’.
Knowledge-intensive sectors
Employment has held up relatively well – and has even 
grown – in some knowledge-intensive service sectors 
since before the crisis: health, education, professional 
services such as legal, accounting and engineering, and 
IT and information services. 
7Retreat from offshoring
Offshoring – relocating business activities outside of a 
country’s borders – is typically seen in developed countries 
as the unattractive flip side of globalisation, with the leaching 
of jobs overseas to countries where labour costs are lower. 
Recent research indicates, however, that despite the lure 
for companies, offshoring may not be as great a menace 
to developed economies as one might assume. Fewer than 
one in ten of all job losses recorded in the ERM database 
each year over the past decade went abroad (Figure 3). The 
level of offshoring halved during the 2008–2009 recession 
and has remained low ever since.
Figure 3: Proportion of total jobs lost to offshoring, 2003–2013 (%)
Up to 2008, the ERM recorded much greater job loss 
to offshoring among the countries that were Member 
States prior to 2004 (10%) compared to the 12 that joined 
subsequently (2%). Post-crisis, however, this difference 
has diminished: the share of large-scale restructuring job 
loss attributable to offshoring for both country groupings 
has been just over 3%. It appears that as the economies 
of these 12 Member States have matured and wage levels 
increased, the labour cost appeal of third countries has 
become more compelling.
Source: ERM
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8Impact at country level
Loss of jobs to offshoring has affected smaller, long-
standing Member States to a much greater extent than 
the EU as a whole. In Denmark, Ireland and Portugal, at 
least one in six (17%–18%) of jobs lost in restructuring 
announcements in 2003–2013 went overseas, compared 
to 4%–7% in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, 
and just 1% in Poland and Romania.
Destination countries
Analysis of ERM data dispels another misconception about 
offshoring: the main destination of jobs offshored from EU 
countries is not China and India (which together account 
for a quarter), but other, newer Member States, where 
wages are lower than in the originating countries. These 
12 together absorb around one-third of offshored jobs. In 
fact, around half of all offshored jobs stay within Europe.
One significant cause of the post-crisis decline in offshoring 
is likely to be a reluctance among companies to make the 
major investment involved in moving business processes 
abroad during a period of economic uncertainty. Since 
the phenomenon appears to be pro-cyclical, however, 
growing and declining in line with the economy, economic 
recovery could see a resurgence in offshoring. Another 
possible reason for the decline is that firms may already 
have offshored the most ‘offshorable’ activities in the pre-
recession period.
High-skilled jobs at risk
A US-based analysis estimates that, in principle, in or 
around a quarter of jobs in the US could be offshored – a 
figure equally applicable to the EU. And there is broad 
agreement among researchers on the subject that jobs 
requiring higher, not lower, levels of education are at 
potentially greater risk of offshoring. Any of the growing 
share of high-skill jobs involving regular, extensive computer 
use – such as STEM (science, technology, engineering 
and maths) jobs – could be performed anywhere, with 
little or no loss of quality. This means that the character 
of offshoring in the future may be different from its current 
guise. To date, offshoring has affected mostly low-skilled 
jobs in developed countries; in the future, it could affect jobs 
in higher occupational groups, requiring higher education 
levels with above-median pay levels.
9Shifts in the structure of 
employment
Decline in middle-income jobs 
While high unemployment is the burning concern of the 
moment, the longer-term changes in the spread of jobs 
along the wage spectrum warrant attention. Over the 
decade-long period of employment expansion in the EU 
from 1998 to 2007, there has been a consistent pattern of 
relatively muted growth in middle-wage jobs, with greater 
growth at both ends of the spectrum, in low-wage and high-
wage jobs. This pattern of polarisation intensified during the 
economic crisis with huge job losses in manufacturing and 
construction, sectors with a preponderance of middle-wage 
jobs. The effect of polarisation is potentially detrimental to 
the social and employment goals of the EU. Not only is it 
is likely to contribute to rising income inequality, there is a 
strong probability that many workers who lose their jobs 
will only find lower-paying jobs available when they look 
for new employment. 
Polarisation when ranked by wage  
While polarisation has eased since the height of the crisis, 
the latest information from Eurofound’s European Jobs 
Monitor (EJM) shows that it is still prevalent. This analysis 
categorises jobs into five pay categories or quintiles – from 
lowest-paying (quintile 1) to highest-paying (quintile 5) – 
and describes the extent of job loss or gain across the 
quintiles. The EJM annual report for 2014, which focuses 
on the two years from mid-2011 to mid-2013, reports little 
change compared with the two years of acute economic 
crisis, between 2008 and 2010, although the extent of job 
loss is not as great (Figure 4). 
Since the crisis, the greatest job loss has continued to occur 
in the middle and mid-low wage quintiles, reflecting the 
ongoing weakness of the construction and manufacturing 
sectors already described. Employment continued to 
expand in the highest quintile, predominantly in knowledge-
intensive services, while a small degree of growth was 
evident in the lowest wage quintile, compared to a moderate 
loss in 2008–2010. 
Figure 4: Employment change by wage quintile, 2008–2010 and 2011–2013 (% per year)
Notes: EU27, Croatia omitted for comparability. Second quarter data; incorporates data adjustments for the Netherlands 
and Germany to reflect changed occupational classifications in 2012–2013 and 2011–2012 respectively.
Source: EU LFS, EU Structure of Earnings Survey (Eurofound calculations) 
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Upgrading when ranked by education, job quality
There is an important caveat to this analysis: wages are not 
the only dimension of job quality. They are certainly important 
and tend to correlate highly with other aspects of job quality, 
but ranking according to wage tends to generate more 
polarised patterns of employment change (greater relative 
growth at the edges, less in the middle) than other ranking 
criteria. When jobs are ranked according to education and 
non-pecuniary job quality, the pattern instead is one of 
occupational upgrading during the period 2011–2013 (Figure 
5). In other words, relative employment growth is greater 
in the higher quintiles, with relatively weaker growth in the 
lower quintiles especially, but also in the middle.
The reason for this discrepancy across the results of the 
three indices is that a high proportion of jobs in the middle 
of the wage distribution have a relative wage premium – a 
higher relative position in terms of wages than education 
or non-pecuniary job quality attributes. The destruction of 
these jobs – often jobs in construction and manufacturing 
where male workers are overrepresented – is recorded in 
quintiles 2 and 3 of the wage distribution but in quintiles 1 
and 2 of the education ranking. 
Figure 5: Annual employment change by wage, education and job quality quintile, 
2011–2013
Source: EU LFS, EU Structure of Earnings Survey (Eurofound calculations) 
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Note: Data for Germany and the Netherlands represent just one year because of breaks in the data series. 
Source: EU LFS, EU Structure of Earnings Survey (Eurofound calculations) 
Employment shifts by country
Looking at the job–wage distribution in each of the Member 
States, shown in Figure 6, polarising employment shifts 
were apparent in Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, 
Malta, Portugal and Spain. While just two years’ worth of 
data is not sufficient for definitive conclusions to be drawn, 
the findings suggest that employment has polarised in all 
four euro zone Member States that have received EU–IMF–
ECB troika assistance, as well as in Spain, which has also 
been beset by economic turmoil. 
The other main pattern is upgrading, which was most 
apparent in Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Poland, Sweden 
and the UK. Employment shifts have also resulted in mainly 
upgrading in France and the Czech Republic, with some 
degree of polarisation or other offsetting features.  
A pattern of downgrading – greater growth in lower-paid 
jobs, accompanied by declining employment in top-paid 
jobs – was evident in Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Romania and Slovakia.
Figure 6:  Patterns of employment change by wage quintile, 2011–2013
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The gender employment gap continues to narrow. Since 
mid-2011, employment among women in the EU has 
increased modestly by 60,000, while male employment 
has declined further, by nearly 1.4 million.
Women have benefited most from employment growth in 
the top quintile and suffered less from employment declines 
in the middle quintiles compared to men. This is partly 
because women disproportionately occupy the top quintile 
job with the highest growth, that of health professional. It 
is also due in part to women’s under-representation in the 
construction and manufacturing jobs – which contributed 
most to lost employment in the middle quintiles. 
Male employment rose modestly in the bottom quintile, 
which is partly related to the take-up of lower-level service 
employment by men displaced from the construction and 
manufacturing sectors. 
Graduate employment increased across all quintiles but 
with a strong skew towards the top quintile, where over 1.7 
million jobs requiring third-level qualifications were created 
between mid-2011 and mid-2013. 
Newly qualified younger graduates did not benefit from this 
employment expansion, however. Employment actually 
declined for graduates aged 15–29 in the period, with the 
main declines occurring in the top two quintiles, while there 
was some modest growth in the lower quintiles. Almost the 
reverse occurred for both core-age workers (30–49 years) 
and older workers (over 50 years), for whom employment 
overall grew across the quintiles and especially in the top 
two quintiles. 
An important factor behind these patterns is that in 2011 
the cohort aged 28–29 – the outflow cohort – was almost 
15% larger than the cohort aged 14–15. Another is the 
relatively greater impact of the crisis on the employment 
opportunities of younger workers and labour market 
entrants, a characteristic of all recessions.
Employment declined for those with primary and secondary 
education, with losses in the former category concentrated 
in jobs at the lower end of the wage distribution, while 
losses in the latter category were mainly in the middle 
and top quintiles.
Employment shifts by demographics
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Part-time employment grew in four of the five quintiles, and 
increased overall by 1.5 million, while full-time employment 
declined. While part-time work was more prevalent in the 
lowest quintile (which has by far the greatest concen-
tration of part-time employment), better-paid jobs were 
also increasingly being filled on a part-time basis. The 
growth of part-time employment in the middle quintiles 
may suggest that some employers have elected to trans-
form full-time positions to part-time as an alternative to 
shedding employment.
Since the recession, part-time work has become somewhat 
less female-dominated. Net new part-time employment 
has been mainly male and strongly skewed towards the 
lower quintiles. 
Fixed-term employment contracted in the EU during 
2011–2013, with the shedding of 800,000 jobs. The ongo-
ing difficulties of the construction sector – especially in 
the southern European Member States – was the main 
contributing factor to declining fixed-term employment 
(accounting for around half of total net losses), although 
substantial losses (177,000) were also recorded in public 
administration. All of the net EU employment growth in the 
top quintile came in the form of permanent jobs.
Source: EU LFS, EU Structure of Earnings Survey (Eurofound calculations)  
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Job trends
The greatest employment growth in recent times has 
been in high-skilled occupations, and there is a trend 
of rising skill intensity even in medium- and low-skilled 
occupational groups. The introduction of new technologies 
into workplaces is accelerating across a wide variety of 
sectors and jobs, with resulting pressure on workers to 
have more advanced skills. Digitisation is revolutionising 
manufacturing, for example, and transforming job profiles 
in production. The 3D printing of complete objects will 
soon be commonplace, eliminating the need for workers 
to assemble parts. Many traditional manual and routine 
jobs such as craft workers, plant operators and machine 
operators are likely to decline or become obsolete, while 
openings for IT specialists, designers, engineers and 
logistics experts will escalate. A potential Eurofound project 
is proposed to investigate the scenarios for the future of 
manufacturing in Europe in the face of such change – but 
it is certain that the decline of the sector as a source of 
employment will continue apace. 
Growing occupations 
Six of the 10 occupations with the greatest growth in 
the two years between 2011 and 2013 are in high-skilled 
service activities (Table 1). Professionals in information and 
communications technology (ICT) are at the top of the list, 
attesting to ICT’s role at the centre of economic activity. 
The growth in health professionals reflects the recent 
increase in health sector employment associated with 
demographic ageing, increasing wealth and the propensity 
of better-off societies to devote an increased share of 
resources to health provision. It also reflects a rebranding 
or upgrading of occupations within the health sector in 
some Member States, whereby associate professionals 
have been reclassified as professionals. 
Demand has also been strong in some low-skilled 
occupations that cannot be easily replaced by technology, 
such as personal services workers and care workers.
Table 1: Top 10 occupations for absolute job gain, 2011–2013
 Employment gain: top 10 jobs 
  Occupation Sector
 1 ICT professionals Computer programming, consultancy, related activities
 2 Health professionals Human health activities
 3 Personal care workers Activities of households
 4 Cleaners and helpers Services to building and landscape activities
 5 Personal service workers Other personal service activities
 6 Science and engineering associate professionals Specialised construction activities
 7 Business and administration professionals Wholesale trade
 8 Business and administration professionals Financial services except insurance and pensions
 9 Personal care workers Residential care activities
 10 Legal, social and cultural professionals Creative, arts and entertainment activities
Source: EU-LFS, EU Structure of Earnings Survey (Eurofound calculations) 
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Declining occupations
Table 2 shows the occupations with the greatest 
employment declines in the period 2011–2013. Three 
are in the construction sector – where aggregate EU 
employment has contracted more or less continuously 
for five years – and one is in agriculture, which is in long-
term decline. The widespread cutbacks in public service 
employment is reflected in job losses in the ‘other clerical 
support workers’ category in public administration. The 
appearance of health associate professionals on the list is 
surprising as health sector employment had been resilient 
throughout the crisis. One possible explanation is the 
occupational upgrading within the sector noted already.
Table 2: Top 10 occupations for absolute job loss, 2011–2013
Focus on white jobs
The health and social care sector is expected to be a 
high-growth sector for jobs over the coming decades, 
due to population ageing and the increased demand for 
healthcare across all age groups. The sector is expected to 
create 1.4 million new jobs by 2020, while the replacement 
of personnel as the current workforce ages and retires will 
lead to 7 million job openings. A majority of these so-called 
‘white jobs’ – 5 million – will be aimed at highly educated 
personnel. Just 200,000 are expected to be targeted at 
low-skilled workers. However, the sector is beset by staff 
shortages. The Commission expects that demand will 
outstrip supply, leading to a shortage of 2 million health 
and social care workers in 2020, of which 1 million will be 
long-term care-givers.
Workforce profile: health and social care
•   The sector is female-dominated: women made up 78% 
of total employment in the EU27 in 2009.  
•   Compared to the total workforce, it is relatively highly 
educated, at least in the EU15. 
•   When the new Member States are included, the 
percentage of workers with higher vocational or university 
education falls to the average in the overall economy.
•   The ratio of part-time work is much higher than in the 
overall economy: 31.6% compared with 18.8%.
•   Despite higher skill levels and challenging working condi-
tions, hourly wages are lower than average in the EU27. 
•   This pay gap has become more pronounced in recent 
years.
 Employment loss: top 10 jobs 
  Occupation Sector
 1 Building and related trades workers Specialised construction activities
 2 Building and related trades workers Construction of buildings
 3 Other clerical support workers Public administration and defence
 4 Labourers  Construction of buildings
 5 Cleaners and helpers Activities of households
 6 Health associate professionals Human health activities
 7 Metal, machinery and related trades workers Manufacture of fabricated metal products, etc.
 8 Drivers and mobile plant operators Land transport
 9 Hospitality, retail and other services managers Food and beverage service activities
 10 Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers  Crop and animal production
Source: EU-LFS, EU Structure of Earnings Survey (Eurofound calculations) 
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Migration of healthcare professionals 
Across the globe, healthcare workers from low-income 
countries are migrating to satisfy the ever-increasing 
demand for labour in high-income countries. This pattern 
is apparent, too, within the EU. Since their accession, the 
10 newer central and eastern European Member States 
have seen an exodus of healthcare workers to several of 
the older EU Member States. In the wake of the crisis, the 
phenomenon has extended to other, crisis-hit Member 
States such as Italy, Portugal and Spain.
While this mobility has eased labour shortages in the 
healthcare systems of the receiving countries, the 
wholesale immigration of healthcare workers has had 
a detrimental effect on the health systems of the countries 
of origin, where there is a pressing need for replacement 
labour in specific areas. Migration in some specialist 
areas such as anaesthesiology, intensive care and 
emergency medicine is already causing concern in 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. 
Eurofound’s research into the migration of healthcare 
workers from the central and eastern European Member 
States identified the push and pull factors that induce 
healthcare staff to leave. Among the push factors are poor 
working conditions, low pay, limited career opportunities 
for doctors, low social status for nurses and shortcomings 
in infrastructure and equipment. The pull factors are 
largely the reverse: good pay, ample career opportunities, 
and so on. The general perception in the central and 
eastern European Member States is that labour shortages 
should be addressed by such means as wage increases, 
better working conditions and retraining. However, it is 
unlikely that health expenditure can be increased to fully 
support such measures.
Return migration is unlikely to offer a solution. While 
there is some evidence that healthcare professionals 
who migrate take up positions below their qualifications 
level, the enhanced living and working conditions in the 
host countries seem to counterbalance this drawback. 
Various reforms have been introduced to try and retain 
healthcare professionals. To offset the massive loss of 
investment in education resulting from emigration in 
Slovakia, for example, training programmes now entail a 
compulsory period of service after graduation or require 
financial compensation.
Central and eastern European countries have no 
choice but to formulate a long-term strategy to solve 
the problems in their healthcare sectors. Support from 
the EU would seem to be crucial, since the issue could 
deepen the already existing disparities between western 
and eastern Member States. 
Growth in home care 
Long-term care is one the fastest-growing subsectors 
within health and social care. As more people live longer 
and the number of people with dementia, chronic illnesses 
and disabilities rise, the demand for care workers has 
increased in tandem. At the same time, the provision of 
informal care by family members is dwindling due to the 
increasing number of women working outside the home. 
The OECD estimates that the formal long-term care work-
force will need to double – at least – by 2050.
The trend in long-term care is towards delivery of services 
that enable people to live in their homes. This is what clients 
want: the vast majority of respondents to a 2007 special 
Eurobarometer on health and long-term care stated that 
they would prefer home-based care rather than institutional 
care. Governments, too, are throwing their weight behind 
more non-institutionalised care, as costs are lower than 
in institutionalised settings and will be more financially 
sustainable as the numbers in need of care rises. It is 
expected that the number of people receiving home-based 
care will increase by 130% by 2050. 
Tackling the poor image  
As with the health and care sector as a whole, long-
term care across the EU is experiencing ongoing labour 
shortages. The situation has been alleviated in the post-
crisis period by the high levels of general unemployment, 
which have increased the take-up of jobs in the sector. 
In the long term, however, the shortage of home-care 
workers – particularly higher-qualified staff – is expected 
to increase. This shortfall will persist unless issues relating 
to careers prospects and working conditions of employees 
are tackled.
Long-term care lacks prestige as a career choice and 
has difficulty attracting workers. This negative public 
perception is not without some justification. Job quality 
in the sector tends to be poor, pay levels are low and the 
work is demanding. In addition, working times are often 
irregular. Some workers have more than one employer and 
work for two or more people on the same day. Overall staff 
turnover is high and career prospects are limited.
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Strategies to attract staff  
To overcome the recruitment problems in the sector and to 
support the creation of a strong workforce and its ongoing 
growth, a variety of strategies are required. Eurofound 
identified the following four strategies aimed at improving 
recruitment and staff retention in the sector. 
Targeting labour reserves 
With high levels of unemployment, efforts should be made 
to recruit unemployed people, immigrants and disabled 
workers into the sector. Employment and training pro-
grammes need to be free of charge and participants 
entitled to keep their existing benefits. 
Promoting careers in the sector among students 
The sector needs to encourage students who are still in 
school to consider a career in health and social care and 
to create specific learning paths and qualifications that 
lead into the sector. It should develop campaigns to target 
students and foster a relationship between this labour 
segment and educational institutions.
Improving the working conditions of current employees 
To realise the potential of existing staff and retain them into 
the future, the sector needs to take a more professional 
approach, with better career opportunities and training 
programmes for existing employees.  
 Improving the operational management and labour 
productivity of organisations
Work should be distributed more effectively among staff 
and job responsibilities allotted according to needs and 
skills. This will contribute to greater efficiency, decrease 
the work pressure on employees at higher qualification 
levels, and enable disadvantaged groups to participate 
in the labour market. 
Events 2013
Results from Eurofound’s report More and better jobs in home-care services were presented at a high-level event 
in September, organised by Eurofound under the auspices of the Lithuanian EU Presidency and hosted by the 
Committee of the Regions in Brussels. The purpose of the conference was to assess the policy challenges for 
long-term care, including personal household services, particularly in relation to job creation and the quality of 
jobs in this sector. 
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Getting young people into 
work
The acute levels of youth unemployment across Europe 
showed no sign of abatement in 2013:  getting young people 
into work continues to be an EU priority in 2014. By the end 
of 2013, close to a quarter of workers between the ages of 
15 and 24 (5.5 million) were unemployed – and this figure 
was double or more in Croatia (49%), Spain (54%) and 
Greece (59%). A further two million young people are not 
at present looking for work, nor participating in any form 
of education – many of these have dropped out and have 
disengaged from the labour market. This group, together 
with the unemployed, constitute the category called NEET 
– young people ‘not in employment, education or training’. 
Eurofound has estimated their cost to the EU economy to 
be €162 billion in 2012 (1.3% of EU GDP), based on benefit 
payments and lost earnings and taxes. 
Youth Guarantee  
Youth Guarantee: All young people up to the age of 25 years should receive a good-quality offer of 
employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within a period of four months of 
becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. 
There are great expectations around the ability of the EU’s 
Youth Guarantee scheme to provide a path into work for 
young people. The June meeting of the European Council, 
under the Irish Presidency, endorsed the scheme and 
called on governments to put it into effect in their own 
countries. The Commission pledged its support to countries 
in developing and setting up their plans. 
The gathering of EU leaders at two high-level conferences, 
in July and November, underscored the urgent need to 
take action. At these meetings, the European partners 
agreed to concentrate both national and EU resources 
to accelerate the implementation of the Youth Guarantee 
and examined the most efficient way to spend the funding. 
They outlined three priorities: 
•   to ensure that young people have the necessary training 
to meet future labour market needs;
•   to integrate the most excluded young people into the 
labour market;
•  to support young people in setting up their own businesses.
Amid scepticism that the original allocation of €6 billion 
would suffice to fund the proper implementation of 
the scheme, the November conference succeeded in 
raising the funding to €45 billion between 2013 and 2015. 
Implementation of the Youth Guarantee scheme was due 
to begin in 2014, starting in countries with regions of high 
youth unemployment (a rate of more than 25%) that had 
applied for funding from the Commission.  
The Youth Guarantee, if fully embraced and assimilated 
into public policy, is an ambitious undertaking. Proponents 
emphasise that it is not simply another programme offered 
alongside other labour market activation initiatives, but an 
umbrella measure offering a raft of new, well-coordinated 
policies. These include the provision of job-search support, 
modernisation of apprenticeship systems, subsidisation 
of hiring, funding apprenticeship or traineeship grants, 
funding of training courses, and provision of start-up grants 
for young entrepreneurs.
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Early youth guarantees
Youth guarantees were pioneered in the Nordic countries from the mid-1980s. In 2007, a new job guarantee 
scheme for young people was introduced in Sweden, while the current Finnish scheme was introduced in 2005 
and revised in 2010. The main characteristics of both schemes are outlined below.
Finland
Within the first three months of a young person being 
registered as a job-seeker, the public employment 
service is obliged to:
1.   develop a personal development plan for the job-
seeker;
2.   carry out a needs assessment of what support is 
needed to find employment;
3.   offer a job, study place (academic or vocational) or 
another activation measure that can enhance their 
employability (such as training, coaching, counselling, 
subsidised work or start-up funding).
Sweden
The job search support offered by the public employment 
service is divided into three phases: 
1.  registration with the public employment service; 
2.   in the following three months, an in-depth assessment 
of the job-seeker’s needs and aspirations is carried 
out; 
3.   after three months of unemployment, job search 
activities are intensified and combined with active 
labour market measures, such as work experience 
placements, traineeships, support in accessing 
education and training, and start-up funding.
If the Youth Guarantee is not simply to be an exercise 
pointing young people towards any job available but about 
placing them on long-term career pathways that develop 
and grow, policy must focus strongly on up-skilling and 
re-training. Labour market mismatches – where young 
people lack the skills that employers are looking for – are 
an enduring problem that hinders the assimilation of young 
people emerging from education into jobs. 
Despite high unemployment, roughly 2.5 million jobs are 
unfilled in Europe, in many cases because employers 
cannot find suitable candidates to fill them. Eurofound’s 
European Company Survey (ECS) repeatedly highlights the 
extent of the problem and its increase over time. When 
Eurofound conducted the first ECS in 2004–2005, 35% 
of establishments reported difficulty recruiting employees 
with the right skills. The figure rose to 37% in 2009, and by 
a further 2 percentage points to 39% in 2013.
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The priority for governments must be that young people 
are not left to cope with unemployment alone. Failure to 
secure a decent job within a reasonable period after leaving 
education leads to precarious or long-term unemployment, 
which can damage an individual’s career prospects, 
earnings and well-being over a lifetime. Some will disengage 
from the labour market and society itself, which presents 
an even more complex challenge. There is also the huge 
economic cost, the bulk of it being foregone economic 
production.
Eurofound’s contribution to EU youth 
employment policy 
Eurofound made several significant inputs along the road 
to launching the Youth Guarantee. The Agency’s research 
is referenced in key policy documents, starting with the 
European Commission initiative to recommend a Youth 
Guarantee in 2012, which cites Eurofound findings on 
the economic cost of NEETs. 
The European Parliament resolution in January 2013 
supporting the Commission’s recommendation pointed 
to Eurofound’s report on the implementation of such 
schemes in Finland and Sweden. 
An informal meeting of the Employment, Social Policy, 
Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) in February 
2013 looked at Eurofound findings substantiating 
the effectiveness of youth guarantee schemes. The 
subsequent Council Recommendation of April 2013 
establishing the Youth Guarantee again includes 
references to Eurofound’s work on NEETs. 
This research on NEETs is also noted in the Framework 
of Actions on Youth Employment agreed by the European 
Social Partners, which aims to promote solutions to 
youth unemployment.
Countries with well-developed apprenticeships and 
vocational education and training systems are also the 
countries with the lowest youth unemployment levels in 
Europe. Other Member States wishing to emulate such 
success will need to modernise their vocational education 
and training systems to better integrate the worlds of 
education and work. The support of employers is essential 
to strengthen these links. In addition, public employment 
services may have to be overhauled so that they have the 
capacity to provide the kind of ad-hoc tailored support that 
young job-seekers need. Member States are at different 
level of readiness to implement the Youth Guarantee. 
A growing economy that provides job opportunities is the 
precondition to reducing youth unemployment. The Youth 
Guarantee can, nevertheless, provide real benefits now and 
in the future in preparing young people for work and guiding 
them towards employment. To be effective, it needs political 
will and investment from Member States, demanding 
partnerships and cooperation across government, public 
and private employment services, business, trade unions, 
educational institutions and youth organisations.  
Success 
factors
No waiting periods: 
immediate action when 
young people are work-ready, 
before they disengage
Labour market integration measures 
such as apprenticeships and 
traineeships already in place
Tailored services, 
personalised development plans, 
career counselling
Delivery of services by well-qualified 
and motivated personnel
Aim for long-term pathways, 
not short-term solutions
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Regaining 
competitiveness 
A dynamic, competitive European economy depends upon the ability of businesses to innovate and 
offer new goods and services that meet the changing demand in the global marketplace. Innovation, 
however, extends beyond products and services to how companies organise their work to create an 
environment where new ideas can grow and people can excel. In companies dependent on knowl-
edge-intensive production, traditional ways of organising workplaces no longer meet the mark. New 
models of organisation are being rolled out in a bid to create an environment where organisations can 
respond to changing customer demand and where creativity can flourish. 
Pay is another key variable linked to competitiveness. Every year the European Semester scrutinises 
pay developments in Member States, and the Commission urges national governments to prevent 
wage growth from outstripping productivity. But it is a contentious area and there is little consensus 
on the role of the EU in overseeing pay developments. Wages are excluded from EU competence, yet 
wage-setting is frequently addressed in the EU’s economic surveillance and country-specific recom-
mendations.
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Work organisation
Theories of modern workplace organisation are rooted in 
the principle that workers perform better when they have 
more autonomy and influence in the organisation. Concepts 
such as flattened organisational hierarchies, distributed 
decision-making and self-directed teamwork aim to give 
workers more responsibility, with the expectation that 
this will unleash creativity and shorten decision paths. A 
dynamic workplace using task rotation to deploy workers 
across different tasks allows organisations to increase their 
ability to respond quickly to changing market conditions. 
At what stage of this workplace transformation did Euro-
pean companies stand in 2013? The first findings of the 
third European Company Survey (ECS), a study based 
on interviews with over 30,000 managers and over 9,000 
employee representatives across Europe, were launched 
in November 2013. These provide some answers and give 
insights into the extent of change currently prevailing in 
European workplaces.
Hierarchy 
The traditional hierarchical structure is widespread, with 
29% of establishments having four or more hierarchical 
levels; a further 43% are structured in three levels. Just 
over a quarter (28%) are flatter, having one or two levels. 
Hierarchical organisation is most prevalent in the financial 
services sector.
Decision-making 
Managers or supervisors decide on the planning and 
execution of daily work tasks in over half (54%) of 
establishments. In 40%, this decision is taken by managers 
and employees together. In only 6% of cases do employees 
decide by themselves.
Teamwork 
Teams work autonomously – in the sense that team 
members decide the division of tasks and are held 
collectively responsible for achieving these tasks – in 20% 
of establishments. In 53% of establishments, management 
makes these decisions. Autonomous teamwork is more 
common in Finland, Denmark and Sweden than in other 
EU Member States.
Task rotation
Two-thirds of establishments have implemented task 
rotation for at least some of their employees. Task rotation 
is most prevalent in construction and manufacturing: in 29% 
of construction establishments and 25% of manufacturing 
establishments, most employees rotate tasks.
Training
Overall, 71% of establishments provided paid time off 
for training to at least some employees in the 12 months 
preceding the survey. Small establishments are least likely 
to give time off for training: in 32%, no employees got any 
paid time off for training, compared with only 9% of large 
establishments.  
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Weathering the crisis
In 2013, many European employers were still struggling 
with an adverse economic climate. 
In 17% of establishments, managers indicated 
that reductions in staff numbers were needed. 
Furthermore, 38% of establishments that had cut 
their staff numbers since 2010 needed to make further 
cuts. Member States differ considerably in this regard, 
however. The anticipated need for staff cuts is highest in 
Cyprus (52%), Greece (41%), Portugal (35%) and Spain 
(32%). In contrast, only 6% of German establishments 
and 10% of UK establishments reported the need to 
reduce staff numbers.  
Workplace morale is surviving: a substantial majority 
of managers (84%) rated the general climate in their 
establishment as ‘good’ or ‘very good’. Against the 
background of the economic crisis, 13% said that the 
workplace climate had worsened since 2010, while 31% 
indicated that it had improved. Small establishments 
were more likely to have a good or very good climate 
than their medium-sized and large counterparts.
Despite high unemployment, 4 out of 10 European 
establishments have difficulties finding employees 
with the skills they need. Problems with finding suitably 
skilled employees are most common in the manufacturing 
sector (43%), and least common in financial services 
(30%). Over 60% of establishments in Austria and the 
Baltic states have difficulties finding suitably skilled 
employees; this is substantially more than in Croatia, 
Cyprus, Greece or Spain (less than 25% in each).
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Employee involvement
Knowledge-intensive economic activity needs forms of 
work organisation that bring out the potential of a high-
skilled workforce. Environments where employees have 
more discretion in decision-making may help to foster the 
high levels of commitment that will motivate employees to 
make full use of their abilities, develop their skills, and take 
the initiative in a work environment where close managerial 
supervision is not feasible. At the same time, employee 
involvement is seen as fundamental to the quality of 
work and is widely thought to be a major factor affecting 
employees’ welfare, their opportunities for self-development, 
satisfaction at work and psychological well-being.
High- versus low-involvement 
organisations
A secondary analysis of data from the European Working 
Conditions Survey (EWCS) studies the benefits of employee 
involvement in decision-making. The research distinguishes 
between two dimensions of employee involvement: task 
discretion and organisational participation. Based on how 
they measure up along these two dimensions, four types 
of workplace organisation emerge, as described in the 
following matrix.
According to this definition, a high-involvement workplace 
organisation provides significant scope for involvement 
in decision-making in the job and in the organisation. A 
minority of European employees – slightly more than a 
quarter – work in this type of environment, while a notably 
larger proportion – 38% – are in organisations that offer 
relatively low levels of involvement. The remaining 35% 
work in organisations that offer intermediate levels of 
involvement – consultative and discretionary organisations.
 High-involvement organisation Consultative organisation
 27% of employees 15% of employees
 Discretionary organisation Low-involvement organisation
 20% of employees 38% of employees  
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Source: Fifth European Working Conditions Survey
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Occupation and involvement
Occupational group is closely related to a person’s level 
of involvement in decision-making at work. White-collar 
workers are more likely to have high levels of autonomy than 
manual workers, and within the white-collar categories, 
managers and professionals enjoy the most autonomy 
(Figure 7). In fact, this is the only occupational group for 
which high involvement is the dominant mode of working, 
with half of all managers and professionals working in this 
type of environment. Involvement declines as position in 
the workplace hierarchy drops. Just 1 in 10 non-skilled 
workers benefits from high-involvement work practices.  
Figure 7: Level of involvement, according to occupation (%)
Low-involvement organisation High-involvement organisation 
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Source: Fifth European Working Conditions Survey
Increasing motivation 
Lack of motivation at work is not rare. ECS data for 2013 
indicate that 17% of managers in EU establishments have 
to deal with problems of motivation. Poor motivation is most 
common in the construction sector and manufacturing, 
where it is an issue for 20% and 19% of managers, 
respectively; it is least often reported in financial services, 
where it is an issue for 13% of managers. 
One the main arguments in favour of greater employee 
involvement is that it increases employee motivation. 
Workers who are committed to their jobs are more likely to 
be willing to put in extra effort, to innovate and to perform 
better-quality work, while there is substantial evidence that 
commitment to the organisation improves organisational 
performance, at least in part through reduced absenteeism 
and less staff turnover. 
The EWCS enables the motivational outcomes of employee 
involvement to be assessed as it provides data on two 
aspects of worker motivation: commitment to the job and 
commitment to the organisation. These are measured 
using five indicators.
Employee motivation, measured along these two axes, rises 
with level of involvement. As Figure 8 shows, the differences 
are substantial. Employees whose work organisation offers 
the greatest scope for participation in decision-making are 
more likely to find their work interesting and to report that 
their jobs give them a feeling of work well done. Level of 
employee involvement also correlates with how people feel 
about the organisations in which they work. Employees 
who have high levels of involvement are more satisfied with 
their working conditions, more likely to feel at home in the 
organisation, and more likely to believe that the organisation 
motivates them to perform optimally.
These results could be attributed to differences in the 
characteristics of employees in these types of work 
organisation or in the type of work they do. However, 
when further statistical analysis takes these factors into 
account, people who work under more participatory forms 
of organisation still have higher motivation. 
Figure 8: Motivation of workers by level of involvement, according to five indicators 
(%)
Commitment to
the organisation
Organisation motivates to give best performance
Low-involvement organisation High-involvement organisation
Feels at home in the organisation
Very satisfied with working conditions
Job gives a feeling of work well done
Job does not include monotonous tasks
76
47
81
56
36
15
53
64
32
46
Commitment
to the job
Commitment to the job •  The job does not involve monotonous tasks 
  •  The job gives a feeling of work well done
Commitment to the organisation •  The employee is very satisfied with the working conditions in the job
  •  The employee feels at home in the organisation
  •  The organisation motivates the employee to give their best performance
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Improving well-being
The view that high involvement improves employee well-
being is based on the premise that giving greater scope 
for employees to share in decision-making leads to 
improvements in the quality of work and in employment 
conditions. These, in turn, provide an important source 
of protection against psychological stress at work. Data 
from the EWCS tend to back this view, as outlined below.
Psychological well-being 
Arguably, organisational conditions that encourage greater 
motivation are potentially damaging to employee well-
being. A greater sense of personal responsibility for the 
outcomes of work could lead to higher levels of anxiety. A 
stronger commitment to work may lead to extended hours 
and increased work intensity, undermining employees’ 
psychological and physical health in the longer term.
However, such conjectures are not borne out by the 
evidence. When employees’ well-being at work is measured, 
it is shown to be higher among workers who have more 
scope for decision-making (Figure 9). Moreover, participation 
in wider organisational decisions has a considerably greater 
effect than the capacity to influence decisions about tasks. 
There is a further modest increase in the well-being scores 
for workers in high-involvement organisations, which 
combine opportunities for employee decision-making 
with respect to both the task and the wider organisation. 
Figure 9: Well-being of workers, according to scope for decision-making
Note: Well-being measured using the WHO-5 Well-being Index; scale 1–6.
Source: Fifth European Working Conditions Survey
High-involvement organisations
4.45
4.21
4.47
4.2
4.37
4.26
High organisational participation
Low organisational participation
Low-involvement organisations
High task discretion
Low task discretion
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Physical health symptoms and sick leave 
Psychological stress can translate into physical symptoms 
such as backache, muscular pains in the shoulders, neck or 
upper limbs, muscular pains in the lower limbs, headaches 
and eyestrain, or stomach ache. It can also lead to absence 
from work on the grounds of health or accidents at work. 
The EWCS shows that all three indicators of physical 
ill-health are lowest for workers who have a high level of 
involvement in decision-making (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Physical health symptoms and absenteeism, according to level of 
employee involvement
One out of seven establishments (13%) in the EU has to contend with high levels of sick leave among employees; 
this is cited more often as a problem in larger establishments. The lowest proportions of managers reporting 
high levels of sick leave are in Greece and Romania (both less than 5%), while the highest are in Luxembourg 
(31%) and Germany (24%). 
Several factors may explain these country differences. First and foremost, they are related to the presence or 
absence of policy arrangements for sick leave – are employees entitled to a certain amount of paid sick leave, for 
example? The labour market situation and job security also play a role: when unemployment or job insecurity is 
high, people are less inclined to take sick leave. 
Source: Fifth European Working Conditions Survey
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accidents at work High-involvement organisation
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Maximising learning opportunities 
The scope for learning new things at work is critical in an 
increasingly knowledge-intensive work environment where 
technology and processes constantly change. There are 
plausible grounds for the view that higher levels of involve-
ment enhance learning opportunities. Where employees 
are given more responsibility, employers have an interest in 
ensuring that they are adequately trained to take sensible 
decisions. Furthermore, involvement in decision-making 
provides opportunities for on-the-job learning in the course 
of everyday work.
Both informal and formal learning at work were considered 
in the EWCS analysis. 
Informal learning was assessed by asking respondents 
whether their job involved learning new things, whether it 
involved solving unforeseen problems, and whether they 
were able to apply their own ideas to their work. 
Formal learning was assessed by asking respondents 
whether they had undergone any training in the previous 
12 months to improve their skills. To capture the quality of 
this training, those who had received it were asked whether 
the training had helped to improve the way they worked.
As Figure 11 shows, a high-involvement organisation is 
linked to the best informal and formal learning environments 
on all measures. The gap between organisations in the 
scope they offer workers to apply new ideas is particularly 
striking, indicating that a high-involvement organisation is 
considerably more effective in tapping into employee cre-
ativity. These differences between organisations remained 
even when other potential influences such as individual 
characteristics and features of the work situation were 
controlled for.
Figure 11: Informal and formal learning opportunities, according to level of employee 
involvement (%)
Formal learning
Training improved work
Low-involvement organisation High-involvement organisation
Received training
44
23
60
42
Informal learning
Applying ideas
Problem solving
85
22
94
67
Learning new things
85
54
Source: Fifth European Working Conditions Survey
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Pay and competitiveness
The European Commission’s oversight of economic gov-
ernance in Member States has intensified as it pursues the 
strategy to stabilise the euro zone and revive the European 
economy. The European Semester – the yearly cycle of 
economic and budgetary policy coordination of Member 
States – has the ultimate objective of improving competi-
tiveness, in the hope that this translates into growing labour 
demand and job creation. Workers’ pay is a focal point of 
the European Semester.
Aligning pay and productivity
Pay is viewed as a key variable linked to competitiveness, 
and in its policy instruments the EU has emphasised that 
wages must support competitiveness. To this end, it has 
repeatedly urged Member States to ensure that pay devel-
ops in line with productivity, and to reform wage-setting 
systems so that they are compatible with this goal. Decen-
tralisation of wage-setting mechanisms to company level 
together with the reform of automatic indexation systems 
have been the main recommendations to emerge from 
the European Semester.
Pursuing such recommendations could mean substantial 
changes to collective bargaining traditions in some Member 
States. In light of such interventions, it is reasonable to ask 
how strongly different wage-setting regimes are associ-
ated with the linking of pay and productivity outcomes. 
According to Eurofound’s research, this association is 
tenuous, at most. 
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These wage-setting regimes have remained relatively 
stable in the wake of the economic crisis, although in some 
countries bargaining has become more decentralised, 
with more bargaining being delegated to company level. 
Ireland and Greece have become decentralised regimes, 
and Slovenia has moved to the intermediate category. 
While these changes suggest a tendency of increasing 
decentralisation, this has not affected the predominant 
level of bargaining in most Member States.
Wage-setting regimes
For this exercise, wage-setting regimes are classified 
according to two variables: the predominant level of wage 
bargaining and the degree of coordination. Wage-bargaining 
levels can be:
•   centralised – taking place at national level between 
trade union confederations, employer associations and 
government;
•  intermediate – taking place at sector or branch level;
•  decentralised – taking place at company level. 
Coordination is the extent to which bargaining is integrated 
along different levels across the economy; it is categorised 
as high, medium or low. Figure 12 shows where the EU28 
Member States fit within the different wage-setting regimes 
in 2005. 
Figure 12: Wage-setting regimes in Member States, 2005
Note: The level of wage bargaining has changed in Greece, Ireland and Slovenia since 2005; see text for details.
Sources: ICTWSS database, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS); European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (EIRO), Eurofound
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Note: Bargaining level as of 2005; Romania not to scale.
Sources: Annual Macroeconomic database (AMECO), European Commission; Eurofound calculations
Pay developments and productivity
Two indicators are widely used to examine the link between 
pay developments and labour productivity: nominal unit 
labour costs and real unit labour costs. The nominal unit 
labour cost is the ratio of compensation per employee to 
real labour productivity per person employed. It indicates 
how much an ‘average’ employer has to pay to command 
one unit of national output. As they are affected by both 
productivity and price developments, nominal unit labour 
costs are used as a proxy for competitiveness.
The real unit labour cost is a measure of the relationship 
between actual compensation per employee in relation to 
nominal labour productivity (in terms of people employed). 
This is equivalent to the nominal unit labour cost but deflated 
with the GDP deflator. Real unit labour costs correspond 
to the share of wages in the total GDP of an economy or 
the wage share.
Trends in nominal unit labour costs
Figure 13 shows that nominal unit labour costs increased 
in every EU28 Member State between 1998 and 2012, with 
a median increase of 2.4% per year. The highest annual 
increase was recorded in Romania, followed by Hungary, 
Latvia and Estonia. The lowest annual increase was seen 
in Germany, followed by Austria, Sweden and Lithuania.
Figure 13: Average annual increase in nominal unit labour costs, 1998–2012 (%)
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These increases were not evenly spread across the whole 
period but were higher in 1999–2003 (median: 2.7%) and 
lower during 2008–2012 (median: 1.7%). Nominal unit 
labour costs fell in Lithuania during 1999–2003 (-1.6%) 
and in Germany during 2004–2008 (-0.4%). Figure 13 
also shows nominal unit labour cost increases in each 
of the Member States, grouped by their wage bargaining 
regimes (as of 2005). No clear link is evident between the 
wage bargaining regime and outcome in terms of growth 
of nominal unit labour costs. Each type of regime gives 
rise to a range of outcomes. 
If one looks at the median outcome of each system, it shows 
that systems with a higher level of coordination had a lower 
growth rate of nominal unit labour costs than systems with 
a low level of coordination over the full period. However, this 
does not hold for the various sub-periods – for example, 
the post-crisis period of 2009–2012 (Figure 14). Several 
countries experienced a fall in their nominal unit labour 
costs during these three years. These were mainly the 
countries that experienced the worst of the crisis: Estonia, 
Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Spain. 
Figure 14: Average annual increase in nominal unit labour costs, 2009–2012 (%)
Note: Bargaining level as of 2012.
Sources: AMECO, European Commission; Eurofound calculations
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Note: Bargaining level as of 2005.
Sources: AMECO, European Commission; Eurofound calculations
Trends in real unit labour costs 
In monitoring macroeconomic imbalances, the EU tracks 
the alignment between nominal unit labour costs and labour 
productivity growth; hence, nominal unit labour costs tend 
to feature more prominently on the European political 
agenda. Employers, on the production-oriented side, also 
tend to focus on nominal unit labour costs. In contrast, 
trade unions are more inclined to look at the development 
of real unit labour costs, the distribution side of the coin, 
and stress that real wage developments should proceed 
in line with real labour productivity. If that were the case, 
workers would be compensated while taking inflation into 
account, so that the wage share remains stable. A constant 
wage share would support domestic demand, contribute 
to price stability and avoid deflation.
The main trend in real unit labour costs between 1998 
and 2012 was one of decline, as shown in Figure 15. In 
the median country – Hungary – real unit labour costs 
decreased by -0.3% per year. They increased most in the 
Czech Republic, Finland and the United Kingdom. The 
largest decreases were recorded in Poland, Lithuania, 
Romania, Latvia, Greece and Spain. Again, there is no 
obvious link with different wage-bargaining regimes over 
the full period: both decline and growth in real unit labour 
costs occur in all types of bargaining regimes.
Figure 15: Average annual increase in real unit labour costs, 1998–2012 (%)
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Figure 16 demonstrates that the general trend of a declining 
wage share reversed in the period during and after the 
crisis, with a rise in 14 Member States. This cyclical return 
to growth took place predominantly in centralised and 
intermediate bargaining regimes. However, the ongoing 
decline in other Member States is probably more related 
to the fact that these countries were most affected by 
the crisis (and hence experienced the highest wage falls).
Figure 16: Average annual increase in real unit labour costs, 2009–2012 (%)
Note: Bargaining level as of 2012.
Sources: AMECO, European Commission; Eurofound calculations
Collectively agreed pay 
When Eurofound added collectively agreed pay to the 
picture, it found that collectively agreed pay – to a greater 
extent than actual compensation – seems to act as a kind 
of insurance for employees in tough economic times. It 
does not entirely keep pace with the ups and downs of 
fluctuations in output. Increases in collectively agreed 
pay are below increases in labour productivity in times of 
boom, but are higher than declines in labour productivity in 
times of crisis. In this sense, collectively agreed pay helps 
to shield workers from cyclical ups and downs. Systems 
with more decentralised bargaining structures and less 
bargaining coverage seem to have less of this insurance 
function, leaving employees more exposed to a risk of 
wage (and job) cuts.
Overall, these preliminary and descriptive findings from 
Eurofound suggest that the more coordinated bargaining 
regimes (with sectoral bargaining being predominant) had 
the closest link between pay and productivity over the 
medium term (1999–2012) and hence the smallest loss of 
wage-related competitiveness. Because of the descrip-
tive nature of this work, however, no empirically sound 
conclusions can be reached, as this research could not 
control for any other potential influences. Further research 
must examine whether the observed links (or lack thereof) 
between wage bargaining regimes and pay outcomes 
persist once such influences are taken into account.
Eurofound maintains a database on collectively agreed pay developments and bargaining systems within the EU. This 
database is online at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb/context.
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Minimum wage scenario in 
the EU
While curbing unwarranted pay growth is an economic 
priority for the EU, low pay is also a pressing concern. 
Having a job is no guarantee of financial security – taking 
a job raises just half of people out of poverty. The crisis has 
depressed wages disproportionately for workers already 
on low pay: according to the European Commission, 8% 
of workers are below the poverty threshold.
Having a decent level of pay is a fundamental part of 
job quality, one of the EU’s employment goals. Yet, by 
Eurostat’s calculations, 17% of employees in 2010 were 
low-wage earners (defined as people earning two-thirds 
or less of the national median gross hourly earnings). In its 
communication ‘Towards a job-rich recovery’, the Com-
mission called on Member States to set minimum wages 
at appropriate levels to prevent in-work poverty. Because 
wages are excluded from EU competences, however, the 
Commission has not attempted to go further and bring 
minimum wages into some form of EU regulation. 
Minimum wages, nevertheless, continued to be a focus 
of interest at EU and national level in 2013. The subject 
was discussed at an informal meeting of EU Ministers for 
Employment and Social Affairs in Vilnius in July, where 
Eurofound presented its analysis of the effects of a harmo-
nised approach to minimum wages in Europe. In Germany, 
the introduction of a national minimum wage was widely 
debated, especially following the federal election; in 2014, 
the coalition government agreed to introduce a national 
minimum wage of €8.50, beginning in 2015. 
Minimum wages in the EU 
All EU countries have some form of minimum wage, but 
the mechanisms for setting them differ, as do the scope 
(how many workers are covered) and the level.
•   Statutory national minimum wages set a single wage 
floor for all employees; the majority of Member States 
use this mechanism. 
•   Collectively agreed national minimum wages also set a 
national level with universal coverage. 
•   Collectively agreed sectoral and occupational minimum 
wages do not establish a universal wage floor, and only 
workers covered by collective agreements are entitled 
to the minimum wage. Although most countries that 
use this mechanism have very high levels of collective 
bargaining coverage (above 80%), in some cases (such 
as Germany) the coverage is much lower (around 60%), 
which leaves many workers unprotected.
Table 3 groups Member States according to the mechanism 
they use to set their minimum wage.
Table 3: EU Member States classified by minimum wage mechanism
Statutory national 
 Czech Republic France Hungary 
 Ireland Latvia Lithuania 
 Luxembourg Malta Netherlands
 Portugal Romania Slovenia
 Spain  UK  Cyprus*
Collectively agreed national
 Belgium Bulgaria Estonia 
 Greece Poland  Slovakia
Collectively agreed sectoral and occupational
 Austria Denmark  Finland
 Germany Italy  Sweden
* Cyprus has an occupation-specific statutory minimum wage underlying the collectively agreed levels
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Hypothetical minimum     
wage thresholds
The idea of a minimum wage coordinated across the EU 
has been proposed as a means of tackling low pay. The 
European Parliament asked the Commission in 2011 to 
study the impact on Member States of a minimum income 
set at EU level and encouraged Member States to develop 
minimum income schemes. The Council of Europe has 
asked Member States to ensure that minimum wage 
levels reach at least a certain percentage of the average 
or median national wage (normally 50% or 60%). 
Against this background, Eurofound examined the poten-
tial impact such a move would have. The analysis looked 
at what proportion of workers in each country would be 
affected should each Member State’s minimum wage 
be set at 60% of its median wage. It also examined how 
difficult it would be to implement this institutionally. The 
results are summarised in Table 4.
Table 4: Quantitative and institutional impacts of a hypothetical minimum wage 
threshold
High
Germany
Cyprus,
Estonia,
Poland
Austria, 
Denmark, 
Italy
Italy, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Romania, 
UK
Czech Republic, Spain, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, 
Slovenia
Bulgaria, 
Greece
Belgium, 
Slovakia
France, 
Portugal
Finland, 
Sweden
High
Collectively agreed 
sectoral and occupational 
minimum wages
High
> 15% of workers 
below the threshold
Medium
10%–15%  of workers 
below the threshold
Low
< 10% of workers 
below the threshold
Low
Statutory 
national 
minimum wages
Medium
Collectively agreed 
national 
minimum wages
Institutional impact
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
im
pa
ct
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Numeric impact
The research found that a coordinated minimum wage at 
a level of 60% of the median national wage would result 
in an increase in minimum wages in most countries. The 
country that would feel the biggest impact – in terms of 
the numbers of workers who would see an increase – is 
Germany, followed closely by Lithuania (Figure 17). These 
two countries have a high number of workers (almost one 
in four) currently below the threshold. Estonia, Ireland, 
Latvia, Luxembourg and the UK would also be significantly 
affected. The number of people below the threshold is 
not related to the national model, whether statutory or 
collectively agreed.
Figure 17: Proportion of employees who would be below the hypothetical EU 
minimum wage threshold (%)
 Source: EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), 2010
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Institutional impact
Institutionally, the coordination of a minimum wage policy 
would be easier in countries with a statutory model because 
the system is less complex and the number of actors 
involved is smaller. The policy would therefore require only 
a commitment from the governments to gradually move 
towards the EU-agreed framework.
In countries where minimum wages are national but col-
lectively agreed, the extent of institutional disruption would 
be greater, since moving towards a common EU threshold 
would diminish the role of the social partners in the setting 
of minimum wages. 
Institutional disruption and difficulty would be greatest in 
countries with collectively agreed sector-specific minimum 
wages because it would either involve a shift towards a kind 
of second-level statutory model (underlying the collectively 
agreed system) or require a commitment to reaching the 
EU target from all the partners involved, at all levels. 
In this context, Germany, again, would be most affected. 
In other countries with sector-specific minimum wages, 
the impact of establishing a common EU threshold would 
be small in quantitative terms because these systems tend 
to have fewer low-paid workers. In Germany, however, 
the functioning of the system of minimum wage-setting 
does not seem to produce the same outcomes as in other 
countries in the same category.
Workers affected
Workers in small companies would benefit from a Europe-
wide minimum wage threshold: nearly 40% of workers who 
earn less than the hypothetical minimum wage threshold 
work in companies with 10 employees or fewer, and 70% 
work in companies with fewer than 50 employees. 
Those who earn less than the threshold work predominantly 
in the personal service sectors: nearly 20% work in retail, 
13% in health, nearly 10% in other services and 8% in 
hotels and restaurants. Almost half work in service and 
elementary occupations, and although the incidence of 
part-time and temporary employment is higher for this 
group, most have permanent and full-time contracts (77% 
and 64% respectively). 
Nearly two-thirds of those potentially affected are women. 
And they are predominantly young: 56% are under 40 
years of age, and 35% are under 29 years. 
Impact on poverty
The minimum wage conjectured here could have a positive 
impact on individual in-work poverty, but this impact would 
be limited because in-work poverty is not a widespread 
phenomenon in Europe. In addition, it would make little 
difference to household-level poverty, since most poverty 
in Europe is related either to not working at all (most poor 
households having no wage earner) or to the composition 
of the household rather than to the wage earned by its 
members. Only 13% of poor households have one or more 
members earning below the threshold and could therefore 
potentially benefit from the policy.
Impact on trade and competitiveness
As far as can be measured, the hypothetical minimum wage 
would be unlikely to have a significant impact on exports 
and international competitiveness. If one compares the 
export intensity of different sectors and the proportion 
of workers below the threshold, it seems that the impact 
of the policy would be twice as great in the non-traded 
as in the highly traded sectors; the most-traded sectors 
have a consistently smaller proportion of workers below 
the threshold.
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Combating undeclared work
Undeclared work is paid work that is lawful but not declared to the public authorities 
for tax and regulatory purposes.
A ‘scourge’ is how László Andor, Commissioner for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, describes 
undeclared work. The informal economy is a source 
of problems on many fronts. Its volume is substantial, 
estimated to be equivalent to 18% of GDP in 2012, but it 
yields no tax or social security contributions for government. 
It side-steps the regulations that protect the working 
conditions of workers and provide for their social security 
rights. Because it avoids the normal costs of business, it 
distorts competition and destabilises legitimate business. 
It also undermines EU policy aimed at job creation, job 
quality and fiscal consolidation. The European Commission 
in its 2012 Employment Package undertook to take action 
against undeclared work.
In 2013, the Commission proposed to create a European 
Platform to improve cooperation at EU level in order to 
prevent and deter undeclared work more effectively. These 
bodies include social security, tax and migration authorities, 
as well as labour inspectorates. 
At a hearing of the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) in June 2013, Eurofound presented 
results from its research into measures to tackle undeclared 
work. Over the past decade, and especially since 2010, 
Member States have increased and diversified their 
strategies to eradicate this activity. These policies can 
be classified into two broad approaches: deterrence and 
enabling compliance. Deterrence aims to detect and punish 
non-compliance with the law, while the enabling approach 
provides encouragement and incentives for people and 
businesses to join the formal economy (see Table 5). 
While some Member States have moved towards adopting 
enabling approaches since the recession, deterrence is 
still preferred among the majority as it is viewed as the 
more effective course of action. 
Eurofound has created a database of these measures – 
183 in all – which could support the work of the European 
Platform. This database is a tool for the systematic sharing 
of knowledge on good practice: it shows what has been 
tried and tested elsewhere; it evaluates the transferability 
of measures across nations, sectors and occupations; 
and it assesses their relative effectiveness. 
Table 5: Approaches to tackling undeclared work
Deterrence  • Improving detection of non-compliance 
  • Punishing non-compliance through penalties
Enabling compliance •  Preventing businesses or people from engaging in undeclared 
work from the outset
  • Enabling the transfer of undeclared work into the declared economy
  • Fostering commitment on the basis of morality
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Sources 
Eurofound’s online ‘Collective wage barganing’ database, available at www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb 
Eurofound (2013), Foundation Focus - Feeling the squeeze? Pay, wages and income under pressure, Dublin.
Eurofound (2013), Tackling undeclared work in 27 EU Member States and Norway: Approaches and measures since 
2008, Dublin.
Eurofound (2013), Third European Company Survey: First findings (résumé), Dublin.
Eurofound (2013), Work organisation and employee involvement in Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg.
Eurofound (2014), Pay in Europe in the 21st century, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
European Commission (2012), ‘Towards a job-rich recovery’, COM(2012) 173 final, Strasbourg.
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Improving work  
There can be no better argument in favour of good working conditions than one of Eurofound’s most 
salient findings: better jobs – jobs that offer good terms of employment, satisfactory working conditions 
and decent pay – stand to benefit both employer and employee. But poor jobs continue to exist, and 
the quality of working conditions for workers continues to vary hugely, not just because of sector or 
occupation, but for reasons associated with the demographic and personal characteristics of workers. 
Gender continues to divide the employment patterns and working conditions of workers. Occupations 
can be ranked along a scale according to their level of gender segregation: from building workers (nearly 
exclusively men) to personal care workers (predominantly women). Or take working time: contrasts in 
the hours that men and women spend in paid and unpaid work persist as the compromises they make 
are influenced by their social roles. Youth seems to be associated largely with disadvantage in the work-
place. Young workers gain less compared to older colleagues in important areas such as pay, training 
and autonomy. Nevertheless, they cope well, coming out with better job satisfaction and less stress.
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Mind the gap: 
Gender, occupation 
and working time
As we have seen, the number of women in employment 
has increased modestly in recent years despite high 
overall unemployment, with women filling more of the 
new high-paying job openings than men. However, the 
narrowing of the gender gap is to a much greater extent 
attributable to the huge job losses among men than to 
the increasing participation of women in work. Women’s 
employment rates remain lower than those of men in all 
Member States, with wide variations by country – ranging 
from 72% in Denmark and Germany to 50% in Croatia, Italy 
and Malta, and as low as 43% in Greece. The inclusion 
of women in the labour force must be accelerated if the 
75% employment target of Europe 2020 is to be achieved.
Greater diversity in working time arrangements, such 
as part-time work and flexible hours, has done much to 
increase women’s participation, enabling them to stay in 
or return to the workforce if they have children. However, 
these arrangements are not always entirely to women’s 
advantage as they can be penalised over the course of 
their careers in terms of aspects such as promotion and 
pensions. Unlike women, men generally conform to the 
model of the full-time worker, but workplace culture around 
working hours could pressurise them to compromise on 
balancing work with life outside work. 
Eurofound conducted an analysis of European Working 
Conditions Survey (EWCS) data to examine inequalities in 
the working conditions of men and women. The research 
sheds light on the nature and depth of disparities in working 
time arrangements. The starting point of this work was 
exploring differences in the distribution of men and women 
across occupations.
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Male-dominated
occupations
Female-dominated
occupations
White collar Blue collar
Mixed
occupations
Building workers
Drivers and operators
Metalworkers
1
4
5
Science and engineering professionals
Mining and construction workers
Production managers
Hospitality and retail managers
Skilled agricultural workers
15
18
29
32
39
Health professionals
Teaching professionals
Sales workers
General clerks
Cleaners
Health associate professionals
Personal care workers
68
69
76
79
79
80
87
Food, wood and garment workers
Numerical clerks
Legal, social and cultural professionals
Business and admin. professionals
Personal service workers
41
50
56
56
59
Segregation by occupation
Gender segregation across occupations is high, with 
60% of women and 64% of men working in occupations 
predominantly made up of their own sex; fewer than 
20% of men and women work in occupations that are 
predominantly composed of the other sex. Figure 16 shows 
the proportions of women in the 20 occupations that 
employ most people, encompassing 76% of all workers. 
Only five occupations could be considered mixed: food, 
wood and garment workers; numerical clerks; legal, social 
and cultural professionals; business professionals; and 
personal service workers. 
While the processes that give rise to occupational gender 
segregation are complex, it is in part influenced by women 
making career choices based on perceived family-friendly 
sectors and organisations, anticipating future decisions 
about work and family.
Figure 18: Proportion of women employees in the 20 biggest occupations (%)
Female domination in the public sector
This preference for jobs that allow for flexible working 
arrangements may partly explain the attractiveness of the 
public sector for women. There is a higher concentration 
of female-dominated occupations in the public sector; 
even when women work in male-dominated occupations, 
they are more likely to work in the public sector than their 
male counterparts. The public sector has traditionally 
led the way in providing good working conditions for 
employees, such as job security, working time flex ibility 
and benefits. However, in the wake of the economic 
crisis, austerity measures implemented by governments 
have led to cuts in public sector jobs and roll-backs on 
working conditions. Inevitably, these adjustments have 
disportionately affected women workers.
Source: Fifth European Working Conditions Survey
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Long hours and short hours
Marked gender disparities prevail in all aspects of working 
time. The findings show that men have taken little advantage 
of the increased flexibility in working time arrangements 
and continue to work more hours on average per week 
than women. They are also more likely to work more than 
the 48 hours limit of the EU Working Time Directive (Figure 
19). However, long working hours have been shown to 
be a barrier to balancing work with home life and to put 
workers at greater risk of poor health and low well-being.
By contrast, women are far more likely to work shorter 
hours. The uneven division of unpaid domestic work 
between women and men often leads women with young 
children to opt for working shorter hours and to seek jobs 
that offer such flexibility. Part-time work has benefits and 
drawbacks: while it enables women to combine work 
and family responsibilities, it can limit career progression 
and training opportunities, and reduce pension rights 
and benefits.
Analysing working time by occupation confirms these 
gender-based working time disparities. Long hours are 
more common in male-dominated occupations, whereas 
short working hours are most prevalent in female-dominated 
occupations.
Disparities in working time
Working hours
•   Male employees work an average of 40.6 hours per 
week, compared with 33.9 hours for women.
•   10% of women work 19 hours or less per week, com-
pared with 5% of men.
•   Just over 20% of men and 10% of women work more 
than 48 hours per week.
•   Total working time (paid working hours, commuting 
hours and unpaid working time combined) for women 
is 64 hours a week, on average, compared with 53.4 
hours for men. 
•   Most of the difference in total working time arises from 
the greater time women spend in caring (26 hours, 
compared with 9 hours for men). 
Working time preferences
•   If men could choose their ideal length of the working 
week, it would be 37.9 hours; for women, it would be 
32.6 hours.
•   16% of women say that they would like to work more 
hours, compared with 11% of men.
Work–life balance
•   17% of women and 19% of men say that their work 
hours do not fit well with their home life.
•   Among men, drivers and mobile plant operators report the 
worst work–life balance (34%), with health professionals 
(29%) also experiencing high levels of misfit. 
•   Among women, those who work in sales (24%) and 
personal services (24%) have the worst work–life balance. 
•   Teaching professionals and general and keyboard clerks 
of both sexes all report a good work–life balance.
 
Work Life
 
Work Life
 
Work Life
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Building workers
Metalworkers
Drivers and operators
Science and engineering professionals
Mining and construction workers
Production managers
Hospitality and retail managers
Skilled agricultural workers
Food, wood and garment workers
Numerical clerks
Legal, social and cultural professionals
Business and admin. professionals
Personal service workers
Health professionals
Teaching professionals
Sales workers
General clerks
Cleaners
Health associate professionals
Professional care workers
Percentages working 
48+ hours per week
7
27
5
20
14
33
6
16
16
26
19
38
21
29
7
11
11
23
9
19
21
36
11
30
3
7
5
5
7
16
10
23
10
9
21
35
39
56
49
58
Percentages working 
< 19 hours per week
2
3
3
2
2
2
1
3
4
5
2
1
7
2
7
2
7
9
4
3
12
8
5
3
12
12
12
3
7
22
11
6
2
17
12
9
3
3
7
5
Male-dominated
occupations
Female-dominated
occupations
Mixed
occupations
Figure 19: Proportion of men and women who work long and short hours in the EU (%)
Unpaid work
An accurate picture of working time cannot be drawn 
without taking unpaid work into the equation. One of 
the main reasons why women’s weekly hours at work 
are less than men’s is because of the greater amount 
of unpaid domestic work – particularly care work – that 
is undertaken by women. When unpaid activities are 
added to paid work, women work, on average, 64 hours 
a week compared with 53.4 hours for men. Most of this 
difference arises from the additional time – almost three 
times as much – spent by women in caring for children or 
older relatives (26 hours compared with 9 hours for men). 
These findings highlight the difficulty in achieving working 
time equality. Public policy has a part to play, in promoting 
the more widespread availability of flexible working time 
arrangements, preventing unfair penalisation of workers 
who opt for those arrangements, and supporting the 
provision of accessible childcare. It also has responsibility 
for ensuring that working hours are excessive for no-one. 
However, culture remains a huge influence. Attitudes 
to the roles of men and women within the family – who 
cares for the children, who does the housework, who 
is the breadwinner – overlap into the workplace to 
determine the shape of working time. Also accountable 
is a workplace culture that questions the commitment of 
employees who seek to more effectively combine work 
with responsibilities outside of work. 
Source: Fifth European Working Conditions Survey
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Events 2013
Diversity in the workplace
Genuinely inclusive growth can only be achieved if all 
workers have the opportunity to work. But age, ability, 
ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation and religion 
too often exclude people from the labour market or 
marginalise their participation. If Europe is to reach the 
employment, poverty-reduction and education targets 
set out in Europe 2020, ensuring equal opportunities for 
all is vital to bring into the labour market those furthest 
from it. Ensuring diversity in the workplace is part of 
the endeavour. 
Eurofound’s 2013 Foundation Seminar Series, whose 
theme was ‘Promoting diversity at the workplace: A 
strategy for inclusion and competitiveness’ sought to 
contribute to the Europe 2020 goals by demonstrating 
the importance of diversity management practices as 
a means of promoting inclusive growth.
All stakeholders have a role to play:
Companies –  by creating job opportunities and 
introducing practices at workplace level aimed at 
integrating workers with different social and cultural 
backgrounds;
Governments – by devising and implementing policies 
and actions against discrimination and exclusion, and 
by supporting company policies aimed at increasing 
their workforce diversity;
Trade unions – by developing specific strategies to 
represent effectively the interests of all workers, especially 
those who experience exclusion.
51
Spotlight on young workers 
The efforts being made at national and EU level to integrate 
young unemployed people into the labour market have 
already been outlined. But getting a job does not necessarily 
imply the end of a young worker’s predicament. For many, 
the reality is that the first step out of unemployment or 
education is into a job with low pay, little security and few 
prospects. Eurofound research finds evidence to show 
that young workers experience less favourable working 
conditions in comparison with their older colleagues – and 
explores the reasons behind the differences.
Sectoral differences 
The wholesale and retail trade is a dominant employer for 
young people: it employs just over one-fifth of workers under 
the age of 25 in the EU27, well above the 14% average for 
the European workforce as a whole. Accommodation and 
food services follows, employing 10% of young workers, 
but just 5% of the entire workforce. Nevertheless, young 
workers are particularly underrepresented in education and 
public administration: each of these sectors accounts for 
around 4% of youth employment, compared with 7% of 
total employment. High proportions of young men work 
in manufacturing and construction, while young women 
have a greater presence in tertiary activities, especially 
social work, education and financial services.
Non-standard forms of employment
A higher proportion of young workers than older workers 
are engaged in temporary or part-time work or other 
non-standard forms of employment, such as temporary 
agency employment and working without contracts. While 
these arrangements, together with apprenticeships and 
traineeships, can be a stepping stone into more secure 
employment, they can also result in successive periods 
of insecure employment. There is some evidence in the 
post-recession period that the transition from temporary 
to permanent employment has declined as employers 
shy away from creating permanent jobs due to economic 
instability. 
Eurostat data for 2012 show that 42% of EU27 workers 
under the age of 25 were employed on a fixed-term or 
temporary basis, considerably above the 14% average. 
Levels of temporary employment were well over 50% in 
France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden. These data also show that 31% of 
young EU27 workers worked part time, compared with the 
EU average of 19%. Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK have particularly high proportions of 
young part-time workers – over 40%. 
Also worth noting is the relatively high number of publically 
subsidised jobs among young people in several countries, 
such as Denmark and France – in France, for example, 25% 
of jobs filled by people aged under 26 years are subsidised. 
Various research studies warn that many of these young 
entrants on subsidy schemes are simply used as cheap 
labour and often do not gain regular employment when 
the scheme is over.
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Working conditions: good news
Job satisfaction
Job satisfaction varies across countries. Young workers, and young labour market entrants in particular, report 
high levels of job satisfaction at work in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and Norway. Studies in Denmark, 
Ireland and Sweden, however, have found job satisfaction to be lower among young workers compared with 
workers in older age groups.
Less stress and good social relationships 
In most countries, young workers report lower work-related stress levels than other age groups. Among Belgian 
workers under 30 years of age, 37% reported work-related stress as a problem, compared with 43% on average. 
In Bulgaria, 28% of workers under 30 years work to tight deadlines, compared with 32% of older workers. Young 
workers also show a high level of satisfaction with the social aspects of their work, particularly regarding contact 
with and support from colleagues. According to the fifth EWCS, three-quarters report that they receive help from 
their colleagues.
Work–life balance
Reconciling the demands of work and non-working life does not seem to be a concern for young workers. The 
absence of children or dependent parents in the lives of most eases the pressures of balancing one with the 
other. For instance, 62% of Dutch workers under 30 years said they never neglected family activities due to work, 
whereas this percentage was 49% among workers aged 30 years or more. 
Working conditions: bad news
Poor working time arrangements
Young people employed full time work longer hours than other age groups on average; they are also more likely to work 
irregular hours – shift work, night work or weekend work. For instance, 41% of young workers in Slovenia worked shifts 
in 2009, compared with a 32% national average. Underemployment is also common: in the UK, 18% of 18–24-year-
olds would like to work more hours than at present.
Lower pay
While pay is a key factor affecting job satisfaction, the pay of young workers is generally less than that of their older 
counterparts. This is usually seen as reflecting their limited work experience and low seniority, and not as unequal 
treatment. Almost half – 14 – of all Member States have a separate statutory national minimum wage for young workers, 
all lower than the standard rate, except in Latvia. For some governments, having a lower minimum wage is a means 
of encouraging employers to employ young workers, thereby helping to reduce acute youth unemployment. 
Nevertheless, low pay can affect the living standards and financial security of young workers. In Austria, 15% of young 
entrants to the labour market stated that their income was insufficient to make ends meet, compared with 7% of young 
workers in the 26–30 age group.
Less autonomy, more boredom
Young entrants have less autonomy than other age groups in making decisions about how and in what order to 
perform tasks, about their pace of work and their working time. More young workers than older workers report having 
monotonous and standardised work, which is accounted for by this lack of autonomy.
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Contrasting experiences
There are important differences in working conditions 
among young workers themselves, depending on their 
personal and occupational characteristics. Female, 
‘younger’, less-qualified and non-native young workers 
have to contend with poorer employment and working 
conditions than their male, ‘older’, better-qualified and 
native counterparts. Young workers employed in small 
enterprises fare worse than those in large enterprises.
Young workers with limited skill-sets are very sensitive to 
the ‘revolving door’ effect – they are, in other words, at a 
higher risk of losing their job and becoming unemployed 
again. This creates uncertainty and is an obstacle to 
developing a stable career. For instance, almost half of 
the less well-educated young labour market entrants 
in Belgium who found a job were unemployed again by 
the end of their first year. 
However, well-qualified entrants are often over-qualified 
for the jobs they take. In some cases, this reflects the 
recruitment behaviour of the employer in asking for a 
higher degree of educational attainment than is needed 
for the job. However, in the context of the economic 
crisis, where there are limited job vacancies, many 
young, highly educated unemployed persons are willing 
to accept any job they can get.
Sources 
Eurofound (2013), Women, men and working conditions in Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Eurofound (2013), Young people and temporary employment in Europe, Dublin.
Eurofound (2014), Working conditions in central public administration, Dublin.
Eurofound (2014), Working conditions of young entrants to the labour market, Dublin.
European Commission (2013), Tackling the gender pay gap in the European Union, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg.
Less access to training 
Research in Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland and Lithuania have found that young workers in these countries have 
less access to training opportunities offered by their employers than other age groups. The reasons for this include the 
greater presence of temporary contracts among young workers, the occupations and sectors in which young people 
usually work, and the general position of young people in the workplace. Research findings from the UK suggest 
that the types of jobs taken up by people leaving school at age 16 and 18 (usually characterised by low pay, low skill 
content, low quality and a temporary nature) offer little access to training.
Higher propensity for accidents
Young workers seem to be at higher risk of having an accident at work than older workers. The most common causes 
of occupational accidents for new labour market entrants include lack of work-based experience, lack of training and 
instruction or supervision on work environment issues and, possibly, unnecessary high risk-taking behaviour. 
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Restoring trust 
and confidence  
The goals of the European Union are ultimately social. Even the economic goals have social ends: what 
is the point of growth, competitiveness and high employment if not to improve the lives of Europeans? 
Yet one of the clearest trends of the past five years in the EU has been one of growing inequality and 
hardship. The financial and economic crisis has become a social crisis, and addressing the quality of 
life of citizens must now be as much a priority as economic policymaking. 
It seems that in the global financial crisis Europe has suffered more and is slower to recover than other 
parts of the world. Little wonder that confidence in the EU is shaken and that trust in the Union has 
declined to an alarmingly low level. Halting this slide must be a priority if the legitimacy of the European 
project is not to be undermined, and a renewed social agenda might serve to support such an endeavour.
A specific focus of social policymaking is public services, which in a depressed economic climate 
have an important role to play in maintaining people’s quality of life. Effective public health, education, 
childcare and transport services benefit all of society and provide some redress to the consequences 
of social inequalities. Publicly provided employment, training, childcare and long-term care services 
are crucial to providing the supports that enable people to engage in work.
The youth employment crisis has put a spotlight on the quality of life of young people. Long stretches 
of joblessness, insecure employment and predictions of a sluggish turnaround in the labour market 
have had far-reaching consequences for their well-being and living standards.
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European Social Model: 
Buffer or barrier? 
A defining ideal of the European project is that economic 
prosperity and social progress go hand in hand. This has 
been encapsulated in the concept of the European Social 
Model, which is characterised by a commitment to high 
employment, generous social provision for all, adequate 
social protection for the disadvantaged and social dialogue. 
The conviction supporting it is that inclusive societies 
committed to social progress are fully compatible with a 
competitive, globalised economy. 
This shared social vision has served to protect citizens 
during the crisis, to varying degrees. Social dialogue has 
contributed to safeguarding viable jobs, labour market 
policies have provided paths into work for the unemployed, 
and social protection has provided a buffer against poverty 
for the vulnerable. But the model has suffered under the 
public budget cuts implemented to reduce government 
spending and sovereign debt. 
Adapting the social model
A joint meeting of Eurofound and three other EU agencies – 
Cedefop, EU-OSHA and the European Training Foundation 
– in 2013 examined how the social model could strengthen 
Europe’s competitiveness. Eurofound’s research provides 
evidence of the model’s viability: the countries that have 
to the largest extent realised the social model have also 
weathered the crisis most successfully – the Nordic states, 
Austria and Germany. These countries enjoy both the 
highest labour market participation and the highest rates 
of high-quality employment. They are also among the 
top countries in the World Economic Forum’s global 
competitiveness ranking.
The Commission affirms that it is not a question 
of abandoning the social model but of adapting it to 
support the goals of recovery and growth. This will involve 
developing enabling policies that invest in people and 
provide them with the opportunities to avoid or rise out 
of poverty and disadvantage so that they can participate 
fully in their societies. The 2013 Social Investment Package 
conceptualises social policy in just this way, with an 
emphasis on building the resilience of individuals and 
targeting social spending to integrate people into the labour 
market and society. 
Events 2013
Foundation Forum: Social and employment policies for a 
fair and competitive Europe
With the fall-out from the financial and economic crisis 
in Europe continuing, the challenges include growing 
inequalities between and within Member States, mass 
unemployment and economic insecurity. It seems clear 
that to find a way towards recovery for the EU as a whole, 
Europe will have to find new approaches and solutions. 
Seeking to provide a high-level forum for debating and 
discussing such approaches, Eurofound held the fifth in 
its series of four-yearly flagship events, the Foundation 
Forum, in February 2013 in Dublin during the Irish EU 
Presidency. Dedicated to the theme of ‘Social and 
employment policies for a fair and competitive Europe’, 
the Forum brought together leading decision-makers, 
opinion-formers and academic experts to exchange 
new ideas and experiences in the search for a more 
sustainable future. The topics discussed included whether 
the economic crisis can trigger social and structural 
change, how social costs may be equitably shared and 
what the future holds for the European Social Model. 
On the final day of the Forum, Commissioner László 
Andor presented his vision on how social investment 
could offer a way out of the crisis. As in other years, the 
Irish government co-hosted the event, this time drawing 
on its recent experience of Ireland in economic crisis. 
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Social dimension of EMU
The relevance of the European Social Model was reinforced 
in 2013 with the commitment at EU level to strengthening 
the social dimension of EMU to ensure that the objectives 
set for fiscal consolidation are compatible with employment 
and social goals. It recognised that social imbalances could 
undermine progress towards EMU. At the same time, the 
Commission signalled its desire to bolster social dialogue, 
acknowledging the need for better involvement of the social 
partners in decision-making on economic policy at EU level.
To increase the visibility of the social dimension, the 
Commission has proposed supplementing the existing 
macroeconomic surveillance framework with a set of social 
indicators for monitoring employment and social trends. 
These include the unemployment rate, NEET rate, household 
income, risk of poverty rate and in-work poverty. This step 
aims to enhance the EU’s ability to identify and tackle social 
and employment problems as they arise. 
Falling living standards
The increased attention to quality of life is important as 
the economic crisis continues to impact on the lives of 
Europeans, and in particular on those most vulnerable to 
the consequences of economic fluctuations. The lacklustre 
recovery is not likely to salvage their wreckages in the near 
future. Especially in the economically embattled Member 
States, citizens will have to tolerate high total unemployment, 
severe youth unemployment, reduced social welfare supports 
and curtailed public services for some time to come. 
In its mid-term evaluation of Europe 2020 in March 2014, 
the Commission conceded that the EU is far off the mark 
of its poverty reduction target and expressed pessimism 
over achieving it. Reaching this target would have seen the 
number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion in 
the EU drop from 114 million in 2009 to 96.4 million people 
by 2020. However, in 2012, the number had in fact increased 
to 124 million. The decline in living standards across Europe 
is reflected in findings from Eurofound’s European Quality 
of Life Survey (EQLS). The survey shows that a greater 
number of people are finding that their household income 
is no longer sufficient to meet their needs. The proportion of 
people having some degree of difficulty making ends meet 
rose from 38% in 2007 to 45% in 2011. Increases were well 
over 10% in eight Member States: Estonia, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the UK.
Another measure of living standards – ability to afford everyday 
goods and services – shows a similar trend. For example, 
the proportion of people who could not afford to heat their 
house rose from 9% in 2007 to 12% in 2011; 37% could not 
afford an annual week’s holiday in 2011, compared with 30% 
in 2007. Out of six items in Eurofound’s deprivation index, 
55% of Europeans can afford all six, but there are wide 
variations by country: only one out of every five can afford 
all six items in Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece and Lithuania, while 
around four out of every five people can afford all items in 
Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden.
People’s sense of social exclusion has increased post-crisis. 
The proportion of individuals who reported feeling ‘left out 
of society’ increased from 10% to 12% on average between 
2007 and 2011. At the individual country level, there were 
increases in the proportion perceiving themselves to be 
socially excluded in a number of Member States, including 
an increase from 8% to 23% in Cyprus, from 8% to 17% 
in the Czech Republic, from 7% to 10% in Germany and 
from 12% to 18% in Greece. Other significant increases 
occurred in Denmark, Estonia, France, Luxembourg and 
Spain. Similarly, more people are unable to pay their utility 
bills and meet their rent or mortgage payments. For instance, 
15% in 2011 reported not paying a utility bill in the previous 
year, compared with 12% in 2007.
Events 2013
Leuven Conference on the Social Investment Package
In May, a conference on the Social Investment Package 
was jointly organised by the European Commission and 
the Irish EU Presidency, together with Eurofound. Held 
in the Leuven Institute for Ireland, under the theme of 
‘Investment, innovation and involvement’, it discussed the 
package with the participants, including policymakers, 
experts, civil society, social partners and the private
sector. The aim was to generate proposals for actions 
to stimulate social investment.
The conference’s main conclusion was that people are 
Europe’s greatest asset, and for Europe to prosper, social 
spending must invest in people throughout the life course. 
It stressed the long-term benefits of early intervention to 
prevent people from sinking into disadvantage.  
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Measures of living standards across the EU
Highest: Bulgaria (2.9), Hungary (2.8) Estonia (2.6) 
Lowest: Luxembourg (0.3), Sweden (0.4), Denmark (0.4)
 
Highest: Greece (40%), Cyprus (37%), Croatia (27%)
Lowest: Sweden (3%), Denmark (3%), Luxembourg (4%)
 
Highest: Greece (22%), Bulgaria (20%), Hungary (17%) 
Lowest: Finland, Austria, Denmark (all 1%)
 
Highest: Greece (85%), Ireland (54%), Hungary (52%) 
Lowest: Luxembourg (16%), Denmark (19%), Finland (19%)
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Trust in public and political 
institutions
Trust in political institutions has been a casualty of the 
global financial crisis. The material consequences of the 
crisis alone – unemployment, financial hardship, cutbacks 
to public services – are cause enough to have dented public 
confidence in governing entities. But debate around the 
crisis has raged in print and electronic media also, and 
the widespread airing of dissent on policy and the path 
out of stagnation has compounded public disillusion. The 
political climate throughout Europe is unsettled. Perceptions 
of how the EU leadership acquitted itself in dealing with 
the crisis certainly vary, but have not been resoundingly 
supportive on the whole. 
This is an inauspicious context for the election of a new 
European Parliament in 2014 and the appointment of a 
new European Commission. Participation in elections to 
the European Parliament has never been high – half of the 
total number of eligible voters voted in the first elections in 
1979 – and turnout has fallen on each successive election. 
At the last elections in 2009, voter turnout was 43% across 
the EU. The negative assessment of EU performance, 
along with growing Euroscepticism, are likely to reinforce 
the prevailing public attitude towards the elections as 
primarily an opportunity to punish national governments 
and to encourage the trend of electing fringe parties with 
little interest in the European project. 
Clearly more must be done to foster the democratic back-
ing of Europeans for the EU and its institutions, towards 
which the dominant mood appears to be one of apathy, 
if not antipathy. The process of economic and monetary 
union must continue if Europe is to strengthen its economic 
framework and avoid future crises. As there is no going 
back, the issue of securing public acceptance of EMU and 
further integration should take precedence. 
Trust in the EU
Analysis of Eurobarometer data over the past decade 
shows that trust in all political institutions has been on a 
downward trend (Figure 20). However, between 2004 and 
2009, a steady 45%–50% of the public tended to trust the 
EU. The change in mood lagged the crisis; trust dropped 
in 2010, presumably as the economic downswing began 
to have a real adverse effect on people’s lives. From that 
point on, trust in the EU has been on the wane, dropping 
to a low of 31% at the last poll at the end of 2013. 
Figure 20: Public trust in the EU, national parliament and national government, 2004–2013 
(%)
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 61-80, European Commission
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What influences trust in public 
institutions?
How big an influence is economic predicament on trust 
in public institutions? The question is worth exploring as 
understanding what influences trust is a starting point to 
getting policymakers to reverse the loss of trust in public 
institutions both at the national and supranational level. 
Analysis of data from the third EQLS provides some revealing 
answers to the question. The EQLS asks respondents about 
their level of trust in the following national institutions: the 
national parliament, the legal system, the police, the press, 
the government and the local authorities. Average trust in 
all these institutions, on a scale of 1 to 10, is 4.85. Figure 
21 shows how certain factors (or variables) affect trust in 
these institutions. A 1-point increase in the value of any 
variable increases or decreases trust to the estimated score 
shown for that variable. For instance, a 1-point increase in 
age category increases trust to a score of 4.93, indicating 
that older people are more likely to have greater trust of 
institutions.
Figure 21: Determinants of trust in public institutions
Note: The analysis of data for Figures 21–24 deals with the 27 EU Member States prior to the accession of Croatia, 
hence the average is taken for the EU27. 
Source: Third European Quality of Life Survey
Urban residence   4.76
5.10 Satisfaction with the economic
 situation in one’s own country
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5.22 Quality of public services
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However, the trust of Europeans as a whole in the EU is 
higher, and has always been higher, than their trust in 
national institutions: 23% said in 2013 that they tended to 
trust their government, while 25% trusted their national 
parliament. Nevertheless, the drop in trust in the EU is 
more persistent over time. Nor is the greater trust in the 
EU replicated in all countries. In Austria, Cyprus, Finland, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK, citizens have 
less trust in the EU than in their national institutions. This 
is not necessarily a result of the crisis – even before that, 
some countries had large Eurosceptic populations. The 
countries that felt the fullest force of the crisis continue to 
have greater trust in the EU; for instance, in Greece, 21% 
trust the EU compared with 12% who trust the national 
government. 
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Among the factors that have the greatest influence is, 
unsurprisingly, a perceived absence of corruption in public 
life, which increases people’s trust in public institutions. 
And, as expected, how people perceive the economic 
situation in their country is also important. This confirms 
that the economic strife of the past several years has been 
a major contributor to declines in trust.
However, interestingly, the greatest impact is Europeans’ 
satisfaction with the quality of public services. A 1-point 
increase in satisfaction with public services raises the 
trust in public institutions from 4.85 to 5.22. This indicates 
that the overall performance of a broad set of public 
institutions, not just the political institutions, is a critical 
factor in trust levels. It suggests that the dynamics of 
trust in national and European political institutions may 
be affected by how successful EU and national policy 
packages are in promoting public service delivery in ways 
that are recognised and appreciated by the public. It also 
gives justification for a more thorough, as well as broader, 
monitoring of institutional performance.
Quality of public services
European countries invest a large proportion of their 
budgets in providing public services to their populations. 
The amount they spend varies from more than 55% of GDP 
in Denmark, Finland, France and Ireland to around 40% 
in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. These public services 
include defence, public order and safety, investments 
in the economy, environmental protection, housing and 
community amenities, health, public transport, recreation, 
cultural and religious provision, education and social 
protection. Spending on public services in different countries 
varies according to the funding available from government 
revenues and the policy goals set by governments. 
The level of spending on the provision of different services 
varies, too. For example, public spending on health is over 
8.2% of GDP in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, but 
is lower than 4.5% in Latvia and under 3.5% in Cyprus. 
Education amounts to 7% of GDP or more in Cyprus, 
Denmark and Sweden, and is 4% or less in Bulgaria, 
Greece and Romania.
A simple assumption would be that as spending increases, 
so too does the quality of services. But analysis of data 
gathered by the EQLS indicates that people’s ratings of 
their public services does not hinge on spending alone.
Country differences
The EQLS gathers information on how Europeans perceive 
the quality of selected public services: health, education, 
state pension system, childcare, long-term care, social 
housing and public transport. Figure 22 shows how the 
populations of the EU Member States rate the quality of 
these public services and compares this with the level of 
total government spending as a percentage of GDP. Austria, 
Luxembourg and Finland are on average rated highest 
for the quality of their public services. These countries 
do spend a relatively high proportion of GDP, but Ireland, 
France and Denmark spend more, and several countries 
spend more than Luxembourg.
Figure 22: Perceived quality of public services compared with total government spending
Note: Scale of 1–70 for rating of public services.
Source: Third European Quality of Life Survey 
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Influences on quality
So, while total government spending affects people’s 
perception of quality of public services, this effect is not as 
strong as expected. This suggests that other factors matter.
EQLS data can be analysed further to discover what these 
factors are. When scored on a scale of 1 to 10, people in 
the EU rate the quality of public services at 6.01 on average. 
Figure 23 illustrates the influence that a number of variables 
have on this score. A 1-point increase in the value of any 
variable increases or decreases perceived quality to the 
estimated value indicated. For example, a 1-point increase 
in difficulty in making ends meet decreases the perceived 
quality of public services from 6.01 to 5.85.
Figure 23: Determinants of perceived quality of public services
The strongest factor affecting the perceived quality of 
public services is an individual’s satisfaction with their 
country’s economic situation. This is more influential than 
their overall life satisfaction. The findings suggest that if 
a person is satisfied with the economic situation in their 
country, they are likely to be supportive of their government, 
which is then reflected in a generally positive evaluation 
of the services delivered by government. The strong 
effect of life satisfaction suggests that people with a more 
positive attitude towards life tend to see their surroundings 
– including quality of society and public services – in a 
generally more positive light. 
It may seem counterintuitive that not being in employment 
is the second strongest factor increasing perception of the 
calibre of public services. However, this is the perception 
among a heterogeneous group; it is dominated by retirees 
and also includes the unemployed, homemakers and 
students. These groups tend to be frequent users of public 
services, a factor that increases perceptions of quality.
Curiously, while total government expenditure and 
satisfaction with the economic situation of one’s own 
country each increases the perceived quality of public 
services when viewed separately, the combination of both 
factors eliminates the effect. It seems that for a person 
who lives in a country where government spending is 
relatively high and who has a high level of satisfaction with 
the economic situation in their country, their perception 
of public service quality decreases, indicating that their 
expectations of provision in their country are not fulfilled. 
Economic hardship has a negative effect: the two strongest 
factors reducing perception of quality in public services are 
difficulty making ends meet and deprivation. This is likely 
to be related to the fact that deprivation is associated with 
increased difficulty in accessing a range of public services; 
yet the poorest are the ones most in need of such services. 
Ensuring access to services for all the population, including 
the economically marginalised, should be a policy priority. 
Source: Third European Quality of Life Survey
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Focus on: Childcare
There is a strong argument for making childcare more 
accessible for parents. Increasing the employment levels 
of women is essential to Europe’s prosperity as the 
population ages; it is also one of the most effective means 
of combating poverty. One of the main barriers to women 
re-entering the labour force once they have children is 
lack of access to affordable childcare. It has been shown 
that pre-school education and care can also have long-
term benefits for children, improving their performance at 
school, reducing early school-leaving and boosting their 
employment prospects once they leave school.
Access to childcare and the employment rate of women are 
strongly related. In countries with high female employment 
rates, users of childcare report fewer difficulties accessing 
childcare services. These countries include the Nordic 
Member States (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and 
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands – all with female 
employment rates above 65%. In contrast, in Greece, Italy 
and Malta, less than 50% of working age women are in work 
and childcare is more difficult to access. These low levels 
of participation and lack of support for participation may 
be related to the persistence of traditional attitudes about 
the role of women in society in southern Europe countries.
The proportion of childcare service users varies throughout 
Europe. It is highest in Denmark, where 42% of the population 
avail of childcare, followed by Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland 
and France, in all of which it is above 25%. Use of childcare 
is lowest in Bulgaria – just 5% of the population avails of 
it – and use is below 10% in Slovakia, Malta and Romania. 
In general, fewer difficulties in access to childcare services 
result in a higher perceived quality of services (Figure 24). 
Access to and quality of childcare services are rated high 
in Finland (the EU country with the highest overall rating 
by respondents for quality, not just by users) and Sweden 
(the EU country with the best access). Both factors are 
also high in Austria, Cyprus and Luxembourg. 
Figure 24: Perceived quality of childcare compared with access 
While access seems to be relatively difficult in Malta and 
Slovenia, both countries show fairly high levels of perceived 
quality. It is interesting to note that while access is rated 
most difficult in Greece, the perceived quality equals that 
of Bulgaria, where access is rated much higher. 
The accessibility of childcare is assessed based on the 
difficulty that users experience in relation to four factors: 
physical access (such as distance or opening hours), 
availability, cost and quality. Of these, cost is the main 
barrier, with 59% of people citing it as a factor that makes 
access difficult. It is a bigger problem for people in the 
lowest income quartile, with 64%, on average, citing it, 
compared with 55% of people in the highest income 
quartile. Among single parents, the rate is 67%. Lack 
of availability is almost as big a problem as cost, posing 
difficulty for 58% of people. These findings should serve 
as pointers to governments on the need to support the 
provision of childcare services, especially among the 
lowest income earners.
Note: Quality of childcare is scored on a scale of 1–10; the childcare accessibility index ranges from -4 to 4. 
Source: Third European Quality of Life Survey
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Quality of life of     
young people
Concern over high – in some cases soaring – youth 
unemployment and its persistence has focused attention 
on the long-term detrimental effect it may have on the 
lives of young people and the societies in which they live. 
Analysis of quality of life data finds that lack of work leads 
to poor well-being, loss of confidence, an undermining of 
trust and expectations, and an increasing risk of social 
exclusion. This section looks at findings from the 2013 
analysis Social situation of young people in Europe, which 
examined the quality of life of those aged 18–29 years in 
the EU28 as the first effects of the economic crisis were 
being felt.  
Delayed independence
Unemployment disempowers the young, preventing them 
from achieving economic independence and moving into 
adulthood. Difficulty finding work has prolonged and 
complicated the transition from education to employment 
for young people in recent years. In 2011, according to 
Eurostat, 67% of school-leavers in the EU27 had a job one 
year after finishing education. But, as a current Eurofound 
project on mapping youth transitions finds, the dynamics 
of this transition differ greatly across Member States. It is 
much more difficult for young people in Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Greece, Italy and Spain, where fewer than 50% entered 
the labour market within one year of leaving education. 
At the other end of the spectrum, over 80% were in work 
in Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
The slowdown in transition into adulthood is illustrated 
by the rise in the number of young people (aged 18–29) 
living with their parents: from 44% in 2007 to 48% in 2011. 
There is wide variation at Member State level: from 15% in 
Finland to 85% in Slovenia and Malta (Figure 25). 
Economic independence is a deciding factor on when to 
move out of home. Just around one-third of young people 
who are employed live with their parents, compared to over 
two-thirds of unemployed young people, and one-half of 
young people still in education.
Figure 25: Proportion of young people living with parents (%)
Source: Third European Quality of Life Survey
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Satisfaction and well-being
The gloomy picture of their employment prospects has 
not, apparently, dented the well-being of young people. 
They seem, on average, more satisfied with their family 
life, social life and life in general than older age groups in 
nearly all countries, and this has not changed significantly 
since before the crisis. Satisfaction with life is lowest among 
unemployed young people at 6.2 (on a scale of 1 to 10), 
compared with an average score of 7.2 among young people 
as a whole. It is also comparatively low (6.8) among those 
who have a partner or children and live with their parents. 
This group is least satisfied with their social life (probably 
due to the presence of young children), but they have the 
greatest satisfaction with their family life. 
Young people also have slightly better mental well-being 
in general than older age groups. When measured using 
the WHO-5 Mental Well-being Index, which rates mental 
health on a scale of 1 to 100, the score for this group is 66; 
people aged 30 and over score 62. This is the case in most 
countries, although there are differences between country 
groups. Young people have better-than-average mental 
well-being in all eastern and some southern European 
countries, especially Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and 
Slovenia. A notable exception is Sweden, where young 
people score 0.3 points lower than the average population 
on the scale.
Among 18–29-year-olds, the highest mental well-being 
scores are for those living with their parents (68), in 
education (68), employed (67) and aged under 25 (67). 
The lowest scores are among those who are unemployed 
or inactive (62) and those living with their own families and 
parents in the same home (61).
Over two-thirds of young people are generally optimistic 
about the future – a figure that has not changed much 
since 2007, and is significantly higher than the average 
for all age groups in the EU (just over 50%). However, in 
many countries young people are less optimistic than 
before, the most dramatic example being Greece, where 
the proportion of young people who are optimistic about 
the future fell from 69% to 26% in 2011. 
Deprivation
Nearly half of all young people in the EU live in households 
experiencing deprivation. Just over a quarter (27%) live with 
moderate deprivation – this means being unable to afford 
annual holidays, to invite friends over or to replace worn-
out furniture. However, a further 22% experience serious 
deprivation, meaning that they cannot afford to keep their 
house warm, to buy meat or fish at least every second 
day if they wish, or to buy new, rather than second-hand, 
clothes. The proportion of young people experiencing 
this more serious form of deprivation has increased by 
six percentage points since 2007; the greatest increases 
have occurred in Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
In nearly all countries, young people are more likely to 
experience moderate levels of deprivation than the general 
population, but are less likely to experience the more serious 
forms of deprivation. The unemployed and young people 
with families living with their parents are more likely to 
experience severe deprivation than other groups of young 
people (Figure 26). This latter group has seen the greatest 
increase since 2007 (a rise of 12 percentage points), which 
suggests that such living arrangements are to some extent 
the result of economic necessity. 
Figure 26: Proportion of young people experiencing severe deprivation, according to living 
arrangements and employment status (%)
Source: Third European Quality of Life Survey
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Social exclusion
Feelings of social exclusion among people under 30 as 
a whole are no more prevalent than in older age groups, 
but lack of employment has a big impact: among young 
people, those who are unemployed or inactive feel more 
excluded from society than those who are employed or 
in education. Young people with a partner and/or children 
who live with parents also feel a high degree of social 
exclusion, which is probably a result of their inability to 
move to their own home. 
There are large variations evident across countries. Social 
exclusion among young people is greatest in Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Greece and lowest in Austria, Denmark and 
Germany, but levels are similar to those of the whole 
populations of these countries. The economic crisis has, 
for the most part, not increased young people’s sense 
of exclusion; exceptions to this are Cyprus, Sweden and 
Greece, where there have been significant increases.
Trust in institutions
Young people as a whole trust institutions as much as 
older people do, with the exception of the police, which 
they trust less. In 2011, young people rated their trust of 
the police at 5.7 on a scale of 1–10 as against 6.0 for older 
groups. However, the police was the only institution that 
young people trusted as much as they did in 2007. Their 
trust in all other institutions – the government, the national 
parliament, the press and the legal system – has decreased 
since before the crisis (Figure 27). These decreases in trust 
are a little less than those reported for older age groups.
Of course, young people’s trust in institutions depends 
strongly on the country context. For instance, in 2011, 
young people trusted government most in the Nordic 
countries and in other high-income countries such as 
Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In contrast, 
trust in the government was low in many countries of 
central and eastern Europe.
Figure 27: Trust in the government among young people, 2007 and 2011
Note: Scale of 1–10.
Source: European Quality of Life Survey
The main change since 2007 is that trust in government 
has plummeted in the southern European countries that 
have been hit hardest by the crisis: Greece, Cyprus and 
Spain. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Luxembourg, elections 
for government had taken place shortly before the survey, 
and in these countries, trust in government had measurably 
increased. Similar changes in young people’s trust were 
measured for other institutions (with the exception of the 
police, as already noted).
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Political activity
Young people do not apparently view politics as a route to 
tackling their social disadvantages. Political activism is low: 
just 6% had attended a meeting of a political organisation 
or contacted a politician in the year prior to the survey, 
while 9% had attended a demonstration. Their typical way 
of participating in political activities is through the rather 
more passive form of signing petitions, which 20% had 
done in the year prior to the survey. Young people currently 
in education are the most likely to participate in political
activities, while those who are unemployed or inactive are 
the least likely.
However, there is a stronger stirring of political protest in 
young people in the most economically troubled countries. 
Young people in Greece, Cyprus and Spain, as well as the 
less economically distressed France, are considerably 
more likely to have attended a demonstration than in other 
countries, with percentages varying between 17% and 22%.
Sources
Eurofound (2012), Third European Quality of Life Survey - Quality of life in Europe: Impacts of the crisis, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Eurofound (2013), Quality of life in Europe: Quality of society and public services, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg.
Eurofound (2013), Foundation Findings – Political trust and civic engagement during the crisis, Publications Office of 
the European Union, Luxembourg.
Eurofound (2013), Foundation Findings – Household over-indebtedness in the EU: The role of informal debts, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Eurofound (2014), Quality of life in Europe: Trends 2003–2011, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Eurofound (2014), Foundation Findings – Social situation of young people in Europe, Dublin.
European Commission (2004–2013), Standard Eurobarometer 61-80, Brussels.
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Eurofound supporting the 
path to recovery 
Europe’s economic storm of the past five years has 
subsided, growth has very tentatively turned upwards, 
and the rise in unemployment has halted. The efforts 
made by the EU leadership towards stabilising the euro 
zone and addressing the structural weaknesses in the 
design of monetary union seem to be bearing fruit, albeit 
slowly. Yet, as Europe steadies itself from the economic 
shock, confidence remains elusive and questions mount 
over what happens next.
The citizens of Europe need answers to such critical issues 
from the new European Commission and Parliament of 2014 
and from EU leaders. Clearly, improving the circumstances 
of citizens is fundamentally dependent on a return to 
growth and the creation of jobs. And the EU’s intense 
concentration on economic stabilisation and regaining 
competitiveness is tackling those ends. The challenge 
cannot be underestimated: the EU must not only sort out 
anomalies whose roots are tangled in its own structures; 
its decisions must also enable the Union to adapt to the 
changing globalised and complex world of now and the 
future.
But there are other obstructions to recovery and progress, 
and EU policy can make appreciable steps in dismantling 
them. Despite soaring unemployment, for instance, 
employers complain that they cannot find staff with the 
right skills. Policies to tackle such mismatches will contribute 
to a better-functioning labour market: policies whose aim 
is to reskill those who have lost their jobs, to reintegrate 
those who have lost touch with the labour market, and 
to better align educational curricula with skills profiles 
needed by industry. Better availability of affordable and 
accessible childcare could open the door into paid work for 
women especially – and this would help raise many from 
poverty. Policies that bolster the efficiency and effectiveness 
of public services and social supports help to shield 
the disadvantaged from the fallout of economic failures. 
Investing in public services has knock-on benefits, not least 
improving trust in the institutions that govern and regulate, 
the institutions that people eye more sceptically post-crisis.
Devising policies that can deliver a better life for Europeans 
demands systematic evidence-gathering and its careful 
analysis and interpretation. This is where Eurofound 
comes in, providing the facts, figures and policy insights 
to demonstrate where and what action needs to be taken.
Its three harmonised surveys, involving more than 30,000 
interviews each, collect facts, perceptions and opinions 
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across Europe. The European Working Conditions Survey 
gathers information from workers about their contracts, job 
security, working time, learning opportunities, workplace 
risks, job satisfaction and more. The European Quality of 
Life Survey interviews citizens on their living conditions, 
living standards, social environment and well-being. The 
European Company Survey asks managers and employee 
representatives about work organisation, work practices 
and social dialogue in their companies to come to a better 
understanding of how these can simultaneously improve 
company performance and outcomes for employees. 
Another important source of information is Eurofound’s 
network of correspondents. These are experts in the 
Member States who monitor and inform us of developments 
in their countries and help us to analyse it. 
Eurofound’s European Restructuring Monitor is a database 
of large-scale restructuring events in private companies 
and the public sector. We draw on this and other third-
party datasets to provide clarity on the evolution of the 
European labour market, its development trajectory and 
the implications of the new international division of labour.
All these data collected and sourced by Eurofound are 
analysed to see where progress is being made in society and 
in work, and where it is not. This enables us, for instance, 
to define what constitutes a good job, what distinguishes a 
bad job, and to conclude that half of workers in Europe are 
in good jobs while one-fifth are in bad jobs. Or it enables 
us to detect the knock-on consequences of unemployment 
for young people, to highlight the increasing numbers living 
at home and experiencing deprivation.
By analysing the data, we can also infer how some attributes 
of the person, workplace or society are affected by other 
attributes. So we can show how much unemployment 
reduces a person’s well-being and sense of social inclusion; 
or that men spend more hours in paid work, but women 
do more work overall if unpaid labour is counted; or that 
parents’ divorce makes it more likely that a young person 
will become NEET. 
We also use the data to compare Member States and, 
crucially, to see the extent to which they mirror or contrast 
with aggregate European patterns. We know, for example, 
that while in Europe as a whole there is growth in highest-
paying jobs and lowest-paying jobs with job loss in the 
middle, the balance is quite different for some countries. 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and Slovakia, for 
instance, have seen job loss in the higher-paying categories 
and job growth in the lower-paying categories. 
The review of the year 2013 documented in these 
pages suggests that Europe is struggling to deliver on 
the improvement of the living and working conditions of 
Europeans, a central goal of European integration from the 
start. Large differences exist not only between different 
groups of citizens, but between Member States. These 
disparities, if not addressed, put the European project in 
jeopardy. Eurofound provides a wealth of knowledge and 
experience whose purpose is to feed into the policies that 
tackle inequalities in employment, work and quality of life; 
it has a key role to play in making living and working in 
Europe better for citizens in the years ahead. 
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Eurofound’s brief
What does Eurofound do for you?
•   We benchmark good practice in industrial relations, living and working conditions, employment and competitiveness
•  We make key actors aware of challenges and solutions
•   We support policymaking by monitoring the latest developments in living and working conditions
Eurofound, a tripartite European Union Agency, provides knowledge to assist in the development of social and work-
related policies.
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